University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2007

The Death of FISA
William C. Banks

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Banks, William C., "The Death of FISA" (2007). Minnesota Law Review. 641.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/641

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

BANKS_4FMT

6/1/2007 11:21:03 AM

Article

The Death of FISA
William C. Banks†
Introduction ........................................................................... 1209
I.
The Origins of FISA ..................................................... 1211
II.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Practice Up to September 11 ....................................... 1211
III. The Post-September 11 Changes ................................ 1211
A. The Collapse of the Foreign Intelligence Purpose
Rule ....................................................................... 1211
B. Avoidance of FISA: The Terrorist Surveillance
Program ................................................................. 1211
C. Synthesizing the Post-September 11
Developments: The Death of FISA ....................... 1211
1. The Wall ........................................................... 1211
2. Statutory Obsolescence and Lone Wolf .......... 1211
IV. The Future Prospects .................................................. 1211
A. FISA and Modern Technology .............................. 1211
B. Is the TSP Lawful? ............................................... 1211
C. Proposals to Amend FISA ..................................... 1211
D. Can FISA Be Saved? ............................................. 1211
1. Minimization Reforms? ................................... 1211
2. An Exclusionary Rule for FISA? ..................... 1211
3. Improved Oversight of FISA Activities .......... 1211
E. Revisions to FISA to Accommodate the TSP ....... 1211
Conclusion .............................................................................. 1211
Blinded by dizzying technical advances in surveillance, and
by the politics of the post-September 11 emergency, Congress
† Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor, Director, Institute for
National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University. Special thanks
for helpful comments to M.E. (Spike) Bowman, Bobby Chesney, Peter RavenHansen, Kim Taipale, and the participants in the 2006 Minnesota Law Review
Symposium, “9/11 Five Years On: A Look at the Global Response to Terrorism.” Excellent research assistance was provided by Jesse Blinick. Copyright
© 2007 by William C. Banks.

1209

BANKS_4FMT

1210

6/1/2007 11:21:03 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:1209

appears poised to grant the twenty-first century equivalent of
eighteenth century general warrants1—allowing the executive
to conduct national security surveillance at will. Even if Congress does not grant such sweeping discretion by statute, arguably the modern general warrant is with us now, by order of
the President. Just as English law permitted the searcher to
“‘break into any shop or place suspected,’”2 the executive
branch has invoked the specter of additional terrorist attacks
against the United States to justify sweeping electronic surveillance of Americans, without judicial approval and outside the
bounds of any statute.3 Within days of September 11, Attorney
General John Ashcroft stated that the Department of Justice
would thereafter be guided by a “paradigm of prevention,” or
preventive enforcement, where every resource would be devoted
to early anticipation of potential terrorism plots.4 Over the last
five years, the determination that the United States cannot
wait until terrorist plots are fully developed and operational before they are stopped has become an established part of the
counter-terrorism landscape,5 while the rise of preventive enforcement as a preferred counter-terrorism approach is a dominant theme in the Department of Justice strategy statements.6
1. General warrants were given to agents of the Crown, permitting
wholesale ransacking of the homes and businesses of political opponents. Following a history of such abuses under Charles I, the courts struck down general warrants and Parliament proscribed them a year later. See William C.
Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2000).
2. William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man’s House Was Not His
Castle: Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37
WM. & MARY Q. 371, 381 (1980) (quoting Copy of Council Order, July 30, 1621,
Earl de la Warr collection, in FOURTH REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON
HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS 312 (London, 1874)).
3. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REDESIGNING DOJ TO PREVENT FUTURE ACTS
OF TERRORISM: RESHAPING THE FBI’S PRIORITIES TO FOCUS ON ANTI(May
29,
2002),
http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive_Index/
TERRORISM
Redesigning_DOJ_to_Prevent_Terrorism.html (noting the extensive preventive measures taken in response to the threat of terrorism).
4. See id.
5. See, e.g., U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE & U.S. HOUSE
PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, JOINT INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS
OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, S. REP. NO. 107-351 & H.R. REP. NO. 107-792, at 33
(2002) (noting key failures in preventative measures prior to the September 11
attacks); Editorial, The Limits of Hindsight, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2003, at
A10.
6. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ANTI-TERRORISM EFFORTS SINCE SEPT. 11, 2001, No. 06-590 (Sept. 5, 2006)

BANKS_4FMT

2007]

6/1/2007 11:21:03 AM

THE DEATH OF FISA

1211

One of the most useful tools available to the government to
learn about terrorist plans before they mature has been the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).7 Whether the
strategy is to arrest the targets of surveillance early, or to continue monitoring in the hopes that more serious and sophisticated terrorists might enlist others as decoys or assets in a
more concrete and more nearly operational plot, FISA permits
the government to keep tabs on the targets without their ever
knowing about the surveillance.8
Enacted in 1978, FISA resulted from an inter-branch compromise. Until then, no president had ever conceded that the
Congress could interpose any set of procedures to confine the
constitutional discretion of the president to engage in electronic
surveillance to protect the national security.9 However, beginning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court recognized an emerging
constitutional right of privacy that is implicated when government conducts electronic surveillance, and courts began to limit
warrantless electronic surveillance.10 Soon thereafter, the Wa[hereinafter DOJ, FACT SHEET], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2006/September/06_opa_590.html; Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the World Affairs
Council of Pittsburgh on Stopping Terrorists Before They Strike: The Justice
Department’s Power of Prevention (Aug. 16, 2006), available at http://www
.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_060816.html (“[W]e need to gather
enough information and evidence during our investigations to ensure a successful prosecution, but we absolutely cannot wait too long, allowing a plot to
develop to its deadly fruition.”); Paul J. McNulty, U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks of Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty at the American
Enterprise Institute (May 24, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
dag/speech/2006/dag_speech_060524.html (“The death and destruction of September 11, 2001 mandate a . . . preventative approach.”).
7. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1862 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).
FISA also prescribes the rules for collecting foreign intelligence information in
the United States. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f ). The Act thus has no bearing on the
United States’ authority to conduct intelligence collection outside the United
States. Although FISA procedures may be employed to conduct physical
searches, this Article examines only the portions of FISA regulating electronic
surveillance in the United States.
8. See id. §§ 1801–1862.
9. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 75 (noting that even in 1976,
President Ford was attempting to submit a bill that would codify current executive branch practices).
10. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967), superseded by
statute, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 95-351,
82 Stat. 212, as recognized in United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450,
1455 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying the Fourth Amendment warrant provision to
electronic surveillance).
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tergate scandal and follow-on investigations of surveillance
abuses by the Nixon administration and the administrations of
earlier Presidents emboldened Congress and persuaded Presidents Ford and Carter to work toward a legislative scheme
permitting secret electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
while providing for judicial involvement and congressional
oversight to assure Americans that past abuses would not be
repeated.11
Five years after the September 11 attacks, FISA unraveled
following the amendments to FISA made at the insistence of
the executive branch.12 A series of events led to this state of affairs. September 11 created an aura of emergency in the government, and the emergency and its politics determined a
range of policy and law developments. Congress essentially
ceded its role in crafting legislation and in national leadership,
while the executive branch seized the initiative to fight the
global war on terrorism at home and abroad with the tools it
could fashion. With a few notable exceptions,13 the courts have
also been sensitized to the emergency.14
Meanwhile, even though the failures to share information
before September 11 did not stem from inadequate authorities
or from legal obstacles, inter-agency finger-pointing at the failure to stop the hijackers15 led to changes in the law to encour11. S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 8–9 (1976), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3909–10.
12. See discussion infra Part III.A–B.
13. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759 (2006) (finding that
the military commissions established by presidential order violated congressional statutory restrictions); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004)
(holding that courts may inquire into the factual basis for the President’s detention of a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct.
2686, 2698 (2004) (holding that the federal district court had habeas corpus
jurisdiction over Guantánamo Bay detainees’ lawsuits and rejecting the argument that it would be unconstitutional to interpret the statute to infringe
upon the President’s powers as commander in chief ).
14. See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006) (upholding the military detention of a U.S. citizen who
was detained upon entering the United States unarmed and held in civilian
custody at the time of military detention); MacWade v. Kelly, No.
05CIV6921RMBFM, 2005 WL 3338573, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005), aff ’d,
460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding based on compelling need a random
container inspection program for New York City subways used to deter terrorist attacks).
15. See September 11 and the Imperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence
Community: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong.
29 (2002) (statement of Sen. Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/shelby
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age information sharing.16 In 2002, relying on post-September
11 changes to FISA that loosened the requirement that “the
purpose” of FISA surveillance is pursuit of foreign intelligence,17 the Department of Justice furthered the dismantling of
one component of the 1978 FISA compromise—the “wall” procedures which ensured that prosecutors would not build their
cases upon or have their cases tainted by unlawfully obtained
evidence.18 A special court of appeals gutted this central premise of FISA when it upheld the Department’s new procedures
permitting the use of FISA even when the primary objective of
the planned surveillance is to find evidence to support a prosecution.19
At the same time, the Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (Patriot Act)20 and rewritten FBI guidelines21 modernized FISA to account for new technologies and
changing tactics in the never-ending leap-frog of the technologies of detection and evasion.22 Despite the Bush
administration’s proclaimed satisfaction with the new tools,
they secretly circumvented the updated FISA procedures in
undertaking a new domestic surveillance program through the
National Security Agency (NSA)—the Terrorist Surveillance
Program (TSP). Although strong negative reactions followed
the media release of the NSA story in December 2005,23 the
administration has made legal arguments to justify not follow.pdf [hereinafter Hearing] (detailing the missed opportunities to share available information about the al Qaeda threat inside the United States before
September 11).
16. William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Surveillance After the Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147, 1166 (2003).
17. Part III.A., infra, considers the effect of the change from “the purpose”
to “a significant purpose” in FISA.
18. Banks, supra note 16, at 1167–68.
19. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 720, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002), cert.
denied, ACLU (2003).
20. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act (Patriot Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801–1862).
21. JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATT’Y GEN., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS (May 30, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
olp/generalcrimes2.pdf.
22. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
23. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
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ing FISA while it supports amendments to the act that would
eviscerate it.24 The administration has repeatedly stated that
the TSP is limited to situations where one end of the communications captured is a known or reasonably suspected affiliate of
al Qaeda, but those assurances are not subject to independent
verification outside the executive branch.25 In any case, if the
TSP can work around FISA for one programmatic purpose, it
would be difficult to stop other such evasions of the FISA
scheme. One way or the other, it looks like FISA is dead.
This Article is a requiem for FISA, and a plea for our
government to restore the constitutional values that FISA
wisely straddled—promoting national security while safeguarding civil liberties. FISA may have been doomed from the start
because of its complex formulations regarding who the government may target, how the government must construct the applications, and how the government must minimize its dissemination of information collected. Still, its core set of
requirements, and the judicial procedures to enforce them, remained in place until 2002.26 Even before September 11, and
exponentially more so since then, a growing criminalization of
terrorism-related activities has made the prosecutorial agenda
a larger part of the sphere of electronic surveillance, and has
accordingly further complicated the task of managing FISA implementation.27 With the long list of amendments enacted in
the Patriot Act in 2001, and some others before and since then,
the original deal from 1978 may have collapsed under its own
weight. Whether from its cumulative complexity, the challenges
of new technologies, or the efforts of the Bush administration
after September 11 to curtail and circumvent its provisions, the
24. See Letter from William E. Moschella, U.S. Assistant Att’y Gen., to
Pat Roberts, Chairman, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, et al. 3 (Dec. 22,
2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/surveillance6.pdf
(arguing that presidential actions were excepted from FISA “procedures”). The
proposed amendments to FISA supported by the administration are described
infra Part III.A.
25. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 23 (noting the White House’s stated
goals to disrupt terrorist plots and the secrecy with which the executive
branch executed the new intelligence-gathering strategy); Letter from William
E. Moschella to Pat Roberts et al., supra note 24, at 1.
26. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (allowing
the expansion of FISA procedures).
27. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support
Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 26–28 (2005)
(outlining the emergence of the prevention strategy). For more on the growth
of the FISA court docket see infra Part III.C.
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central premise of the FISA compromise—authorizing secret
electronic surveillance for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence, but subjecting applications to judicial scrutiny and
the entire process to congressional oversight28—has been lost.
The change in the purpose requirement and dismantling of
the procedural wall in 2002 all but eliminated the protection
against skirting Fourth Amendment requirements when misusing FISA to develop evidence for prosecution.29 FISA became
something that it was never intended to be—an alternative to
the traditional law enforcement procedures for building a
criminal case against alleged terrorists that circumvents constitutional requirements.30 The TSP is, in some ways, even
worse. Unless the executive branch has the constitutional authority to go around FISA, the TSP is a stark violation of limits
on surveillance set by Congress.31 Instead of taking steps to
reign in the NSA program, however, Congress is poised either
to authorize open-ended and untargeted surveillance programs,
or simply to make the FISA procedures optional.32 Even if Congress takes no action to authorize or regulate the TSP, it will be
acquiescing in electronic surveillance activities that lack statutory authority.33
Part I reviews the origins of FISA, the modern problems
that demand secret surveillance capabilities, and the constitutional and political backdrop for the legislation. It also briefly
sets out the statutory provisions and its structure. Part II examines the practice under FISA before September 11, particularly the developments that led to the erection of the wall between law enforcement and foreign intelligence. Part III
reviews post-September 11 changes, focusing on the change in
the Patriot Act that led to the dismantling of the requirement
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f ) (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (stating that FISA is
the “exclusive means” to conduct electronic surveillance); Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (establishing that it is a criminal offense to conduct electronic surveillance “except as authorized by statute”).
29. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1174–84.
30. See id.
31. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 23 (describing the Bush administration’s circumvention of established, statutory-derived surveillance procedures).
32. Part. IV.C. discuses the congressional response to the NSA program.
33. See WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE 115–17 (1994) and William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 73–74 (1988) for the
legal effects of congressional acquiescence to executive practices.
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that “the purpose” of FISA-ordered surveillance be pursuit of
foreign intelligence and the avoidance of FISA through the
NSA TSP. These two developments lead inexorably to the unraveling of the 1978 FISA compromise and, thus, to the death
of FISA. Part IV considers whether technological change makes
FISA obsolete, and offers some tentative conclusions on the
lawfulness of the TSP. Then I review some proposals to amend
and perhaps save FISA while accommodating the TSP, although the prominent efforts in the administration and Congress to amend FISA to accommodate the NSA program and to
make optional the use of FISA processes only make more likely
the final days of FISA.
I. THE ORIGINS OF FISA
Since our founding as a nation, the government has worried about espionage committed by hostile foreign agents.34
More recently, the fear of terrorist attacks directed at the
United States at home and abroad has overtaken foreign espionage as the preeminent national security threat.35 To counter
these threats, we have relied on many of the techniques used in
everyday criminal investigations in pursuit of foreign intelligence, including electronic surveillance, physical searches, and
the use of undercover agents and informants.36 With the digital
revolution, communications and surveillance technologies have
grown explosively. The government can now watch and listen
to telephone, e-mail, or Internet communication in almost any
circumstance, and it can power through massive amounts of
electronic data in search of relevant information almost instantaneously.37 The digital revolution does not enable government
to collate or assess the importance of the enormous quantity of
raw data, leaving that task constrained by human capacities
and resources. Even though the amount of collected data that
can be evaluated is a small percentage of what is collected, the
available intelligence still dwarfs the pre-digital amount.38
34. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 10–17.
35. See THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 43–46 (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/
2006 (discussing the transformation of the objections of national security institutions).
36. Banks, supra note 16, at 1151–52.
37. PATRICK J. MCMAHON, CONFERENCE RAPPORTEUR, COUNTERTERRORISM TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY 39–55 (2005).
38. See PATRICK RADDEN KEEFE, CHATTER: DISPATCHES FROM THE SE-
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Now that terrorism has overtaken espionage as the dominant investigative concern in protecting the national security,
we have come to realize that terrorism presents difficult challenges in our legal culture. Experience has shown that our
criminal laws and traditional law enforcement methods cannot
provide sufficient protection against terrorism.39 Arrest and
prosecution have proven successful in some instances, sometimes before and at other times after the planned terrorist
act,40 but the risk that grave harm may occur from a terrorist
attack—another September 11, for example, or a biological
weapons attack—forces us to look for other preventive tools.
Over time, these investigative techniques have anticipated and
prevented many plots that would have harmed Americans.41
Consider these examples:
In 1982, as part of an ongoing investigation of Armenian
terrorist groups, FBI agents in Los Angeles monitored a courtauthorized electronic surveillance of a home in Santa Monica,
trying to learn more about a suspected plot by an Armenian
group to bomb the Honorary Turkish Consulate in Philadelphia.42 During the course of the surveillance, the FBI learned
that the targets of the surveillance were building a bomb.43 Although the plotters managed to transport dynamite inside
checked luggage on board a United States commercial airliner,
the suspects were arrested before the bomb was moved to its
intended target.44 Criminal convictions were obtained, and the
evidence at trial included tape recordings and logs of the electronic surveillance that had been undertaken for the purpose of
obtaining foreign intelligence.45
In 1981, U.S. citizens affiliated with the Provisional Irish
Republican Army (PIRA) sought out a seller of surveillance and
CRET WORLD OF GLOBAL EAVESDROPPING 123–25 (2005) (describing the role of
human intervention in prioritizing the evaluation of raw intelligence data).
39. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 8–10 (noting that the goal of
national security—to prevent criminal activity before it occurs—is difficult to
reconcile with criminal law legal standards).
40. See Chesney, supra note 27, at 26–47.
41. Hearing on U.S. Federal Efforts to Combat Terrorism Before the S.
Comm. on Appropriations Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft,
U.S. Att’y Gen.), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimony/2001/
ag_statement_05_09_01.htm.
42. United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 961 (9th Cir. 1988).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 962.
45. Id. at 962, 964–65.
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counter surveillance equipment, identified themselves as members of the PIRA, and explained that they wanted to use the
equipment they would purchase against the British in Northern Ireland.46 The merchant informed the FBI of this and subsequent conversations, and the FBI began to conduct electronic
surveillance of the home telephone of one of the PIRA members.47 Over time, the surveillance revealed efforts by the target
and others affiliated with the PIRA to obtain weapons, including surface-to-air (SAM) missiles.48 Before their deals were consummated, four PIRA members were arrested and convicted of
conspiracy and weapons-related charges, based in part on the
fruits of the electronic surveillance.49
In 1992, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) detained Mohammed Hammoud, a citizen of Lebanon, when he
attempted to enter the United States using fraudulent documents.50 While his application for asylum was pending, Hammoud earned permanent resident status by marrying a United
States citizen.51 In the mid-1990s, Hammoud, along with his
wife, a brother, and his cousins became involved in cigarette
smuggling.52 During the same period, Hammoud began leading
weekly prayer services for Shi’a Muslims in the Charlotte,
North Carolina area, where he urged attendees to donate
money to Hezbollah, an organization founded by Lebanese
Shi’a Muslims that provides humanitarian aid to Shi’a Muslims
and supports terrorism in opposition to Israel and to the United
States presence in the Middle East.53 Hammoud was charged
and convicted of providing material support to a designated
foreign terrorist organization, along with collateral crimes, including money laundering, credit card fraud, and transportation of contraband cigarettes, in part based on evidence from
recorded telephone conversations between Hammoud and others.54

46. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1984).
47. Id. at 65–66.
48. Id. at 66.
49. Id. at 67.
50. United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 325 (4th Cir. 2004) (en
banc), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 326.
54. Id. at 326–27.
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From December 2001 until August 2003, Hemant Lakhani
met several times in person and had telephone conversations
with an FBI informant who posed as an arms dealer.55 In 2005,
a New Jersey federal jury convicted Hemant Lakhani, an Indian-born United Kingdom national, for attempting to provide
material support to terrorists and for his role in trying to sell
an anti-aircraft missile to a man whom he believed represented
a terrorist group intent on shooting down a United States
commercial airliner.56 Recordings of the conversations and
meetings became part of the evidence in the criminal case
against Lakhani.57
At its most effective, electronic surveillance captures conversations and movements about plans to commit a terrorist
act and thus allows the government to step in before the crime
occurs. Of course, electronic surveillance may also impose a
heavy cost. An array of personal privacy and expressive freedom interests are threatened by electronic surveillance, especially surveillance that is undertaken on a long-term, 24/7 basis.58 Those who know or suspect the government of monitoring
their conversations self-censor their conversations, inhibiting
free-flowing expression.59 Individual interests in anonymity are
compromised, as are self-determination choices and freedom of
association.60 As the Supreme Court has noted, electronic surveillance for national security purposes may also implicate a
“convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not present in cases of ‘ordinary’ crime,” when it targets those whose
activities are politically motivated.61 Government interests may
be stronger in these areas, but there is also a greater risk of
jeopardizing protected expression.62
The use of traditional law enforcement techniques brings
along with it traditional Fourth Amendment requirements, including the need to establish that a crime has been committed
55. Complaint at 1, United States v. Lakhani, Mag. No. 03-7106 (D.N.J.
2003); This American Life: The Arms Trader, Episode 292 (WBEZ Chicago
television broadcast July 8, 2005), available at http://www.thislife.org/pages/
descriptions/05/292.html.
56. This American Life: The Arms Trader, supra note 55.
57. Complaint, supra note 55, at 1–8.
58. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 491–
99 (2006).
59. Id. at 495.
60. See id. at 491–99.
61. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
62. Id.
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or is imminent before a judge will issue a warrant to conduct
electronic surveillance.63 Because of the gravity of the threat of
terrorism and the consequences of those acts, the government
has sought the authority to undertake surveillance with something less than the criminal law standard.64 The grave danger
of international terrorism arguably justifies the more permissive FISA regime, and the privacy intrusions are limited to the
collection of information for foreign intelligence purposes. At
the same time, foreign intelligence collection tends to be programmatic, focusing on nascent schemes and following up on
ambiguous leads.65 In addition, terrorists in a loosely defined
cell structure are hard to identify in general, and they are typically trained not to engage in criminal conduct that would justify the criminal variant of electronic surveillance.66 Ordinary
crimes electronic surveillance requires that an application for a
warrant contain detailed information about the alleged criminal offense, the facilities and communication sought to be intercepted, the identity of the target (if known), the period of time
sought for the surveillance, and an explanation of whether
other investigative methods could achieve the objective.67
The need for secrecy and the often more open-ended purpose of monitoring a target for foreign intelligence makes the
ordinary crimes warrant procedures ill-suited for foreign intelligence gathering.68 Clearly, something less than a completed
act of international terrorism should be required before launching electronic surveillance in pursuit of foreign intelligence.69
However, deciding just how much evidence of a connection of a
potential target to a terrorist group or to terrorist activities
should be required is a nettlesome problem.70 Without suffi63. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510–2520 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
64. Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 8–10 (discussing the differences in
the legal standards for surveillance of terrorism and ordinary crimes investigations).
65. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1148 (discussing new legislative tools to
facilitate intelligence-gathering and analysis).
66. See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution
and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 427–28
(2007) (describing the challenges of dealing with unaffiliated terrorists).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)–(d) (2000).
68. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 5–10.
69. Id. at 7, 9 (noting that national security investigations are based on
different probable cause standards than criminal investigations as a result of
their unique objectives).
70. Id. at 5–10.
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cient controls, electronic surveillance is an especially ominous
form of investigation because, in a digital world, it records and
may store and retrieve forever not just the information that investigators seek but everything that the target communicates,
no matter how unrelated to the purpose of the surveillance.71
The metaphor commonly associated with electronic surveillance is the net that captures everything.72 If not leavened with
controls, electronic surveillance may become the contemporary
equivalent of the eighteenth century English general warrants.
The general warrant was abandoned in England, but English law did not recognize a right of privacy.73 As similar overreaching by Crown agents persisted in the colonies through the
use of writs of assistance, colonists lacked a legal remedy.74 It
was thus hardly a surprise that the Bill of Rights would include
in the Fourth Amendment protection against the abuses of
general warrants.75
Of course the Framers could not foresee the problems that
would arise in adapting the Fourth Amendment to electronic
surveillance. How should its two clauses—the protection
against “unreasonable searches and seizures”76 and the warrant requirement77—apply to electronic surveillance? Must
pursuit of foreign intelligence follow the Fourth Amendment
rules at all, if undertaken inside the United States? If the
Fourth Amendment does not offer clear guidance, may Congress legislate to implement and clarify its requirements for
gathering information about international terrorism?
Applied to the gathering of foreign intelligence, electronic
surveillance offers these same advantages of being able to
watch and listen without limitation and to learn about espionage or terrorist activities that may be only in the planning
stages. As electronic surveillance became a common tool of law
enforcement, so did it enter the world of intelligence investigations in the United States, first by the FBI and then later by

71. Solove, supra note 58, at 491–99.
72. Id. at 495 (noting that electronic surveillance also records behavior
and social interaction).
73. Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 3.
74. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 29–30 (1970).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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the CIA and other intelligence agencies.78 As countering terrorism became a central national security challenge, the investigative community was faced with the reality that its purpose in
investigating might simultaneously be gathering foreign intelligence and enforcing the criminal laws.79 While the rules for
the two types of investigation look very much alike, they differ
in some important respects, and they historically remained
separate from one another, to protect the integrity of each
one.80
Only in 1967 did the Supreme Court hold that the Fourth
Amendment warrant clause applies to electronic surveillance.81
In Katz v. United States, the Court also held that warrantless
searches “are per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”82 At the
time, no foreign intelligence or national security exception had
been so recognized, although the Katz Court expressly declined
to extend its holding to cases “involving the national security.”83 In 1968, Congress responded to Katz and enacted legislation creating procedures for judicial authorization of electronic surveillance in law enforcement investigations,84 but the
legislation explicitly noted that Congress did not intend to set
rules for national security investigations.85
In 1972, the Supreme Court addressed electronic surveillance in a national security setting for the first time. In United
States v. United States District Court (Keith),86 defendants
charged with conspiring to bomb a CIA office in Ann Arbor,
Michigan, sought in pretrial proceedings electronic surveillance
logs that the government had obtained without a warrant.87
The government admitted that a warrantless wiretap had in78. Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 19–31.
79. See, e.g., id. at 9 (noting that terrorism is the exception to the general
rule).
80. Id. at 8–9.
81. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), superseded by statute,
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 95-351, 82 Stat.
212, as recognized in United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450, 1455 (9th
Cir. 1992).
82. Id. at 358.
83. Id. at 358 n.23.
84. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2000)).
85. § 802, 82 Stat. at 214 (repealed 1978).
86. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). This case is typically known as the Keith decision, after Damon Keith, the district court judge who presided over the case.
87. Id. at 299–300.
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tercepted conversations involving the defendants,88 but it defended the wiretap on the basis of the Constitution and a disclaimer in the 1968 Crime Control Act.89
The Court first rejected the statutory argument.90 The government argued that the provision of the 1968 Crime Control
Act regulating electronic surveillance for domestic law enforcement purposes that excluded from its coverage surveillance carried out pursuant to the “constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack . . . [and] to
obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the
security of the United States”91 expressed an intention to allow
unmonitored electronic surveillance for national security purposes.92 According to the Court, the disclaimer conferred no
new authority and simply left presidential powers untouched.93
The Court found authority in the oath clause94 for the
power “to protect our Government against those who would
subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means.”95 However, the
Court determined that the President must exercise the Article
II authority consistently with the Bill of Rights.96 Although the
Attorney General had personally approved the wiretaps and
claimed that he had exercised the President’s powers to protect
the nation against the threat that domestic organizations
would attack the government,97 the Court held that domestic
national security wiretaps required a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate.98 The Court relied on the “broader spirit” of the
Fourth Amendment and found that the “convergence of First
and Fourth Amendment values” justified special wariness
when the government undertakes national security wiretapping.99 In arriving at its holding, the Court balanced “the duty
of Government to protect the domestic security, [against] the
88. Id. at 300.
89. § 802, 82 Stat. at 214; Keith, 407 U.S. at 302–03.
90. Keith, 407 U.S. at 303.
91. § 802, 82 Stat. at 214. The Keith Court interpreted the provision as
having “left presidential powers where it found them.” 407 U.S. at 303.
92. Keith, 407 U.S. at 303.
93. Id. at 308.
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
95. Keith, 407 U.S. at 310.
96. Id. at 312–13.
97. Id. at 300–01.
98. Id. at 323–24.
99. Id. at 313.
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potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free expression.”100 Writing for the Court,
Justice Powell concluded that waiving the Fourth Amendment
probable cause requirement and allowing “unreviewed executive discretion” to be practiced could cause the executive to
“yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence
and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected
speech.”101
Although the government cited the unique characteristics
of ongoing national security surveillance and its fear that leaks
could undermine the sources and methods of intelligence collection, the Court refused to recognize an exception to Katz for national security surveillance.102 The Court took note of the potential for abuse of warrantless surveillance, and it noted that
courts had the capacity to manage sensitive information and
could protect intelligence sources and methods through ex
parte proceedings.103 At the same time, Justice Powell emphasized that the case involved domestic targets of surveillance
and that the Court expressed no opinion on the executive discretion to conduct such surveillance when foreign powers or
their agents are targeted.104 In addition, the Court expressly
reserved the question whether similar rules should govern foreign intelligence surveillance and, after noting the “different
policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of ‘ordinary crime’”105 in investigating national security, the Court
supplied a back-handed invitation for Congress to legislate a
set of rules for what remained an uncertain terrain—national
security investigations—for domestic and foreign intelligence.106
Meanwhile, after Keith, two courts of appeals upheld the
constitutional authorities of the executive branch to conduct
warrantless electronic surveillance in pursuit of foreign intelligence.107 However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbiaalso decided a high-profile case at the edges of the postWatergate prosecution of the White House-ordered break-in of
100. Id. at 314–15.
101. Id. at 317.
102. Id. at 320–21.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 321–22.
105. Id. at 322.
106. Id. at 322–23.
107. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc);
United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426–27 (5th Cir. 1973).
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the Democratic Party headquarters. In United States v. Ehrlichman,108 “Ehrlichman, the former Chief of Staff to President
Nixon, argued that the activity he had authorized was a national security, counterintelligence operation, and therefore not
illegal.”109 Although the court held that Ehrlichman could not
rely on such a defense because he “could not show presidential
authorization . . . two of the three judges wrote a separate concurrence [to say that] no intelligence or counterintelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment existed.”110
FISA was the product of a set of compromises unique to
their time. The executive branch wanted a continuing discretion to employ wiretapping for foreign intelligence unfettered
by judicial or congressional oversight.111 Because Keith was a
domestic security case, the door was not shut.112 In addition,
because Keith acknowledged a possibility that the rules might
be different for foreign intelligence and the 1968 Crime Control
Act disclaimed prescribing any rule for foreign intelligence
gathering, it remained plausible to argue that the executive
might make its own rules for collecting foreign intelligence.113
The executive branch’s position was weakened considerably,
however, by the effects of the Watergate scandal, lawsuits challenging warrantless surveillance, and the practical problem
that telephone companies and government agencies were unwilling to approve electronic surveillance without a court order.114 There were, in addition, high profile investigations of illegal spying by intelligence agencies, including by the Senate
Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee).115 The
Church Committee reviewed nearly forty years of domestic
108. 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
109. Diane Carraway Piette & Jessely Radack, Piercing the “Historical
Mists”: The People and Events Behind the Passage of FISA and the Creation of
the “Wall,” 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 437, 448 (2006).
110. Id.
111. Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 75.
112. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321–22 (1972).
113. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 50–52.
114. Piette & Radack, supra note 109, at 448; see also S.2726 to Amend the
National Security Act of 1947 to Improve U.S. Counterintelligence Measures:
Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence of the United States S., 101st
Cong. 136 (1990) (testimony of Mary Lawton, Counsel, Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review, U.S. Department of Justice) (“Electronic surveillance can
only be done with phone company cooperation . . . .”).
115. See S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. (1975) (enacted) (describing the investigative committees that reviewed intelligence activities).
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surveillance, learning that every President since Franklin D.
Roosevelt had asserted and used the authority to authorize
warrantless electronic surveillance and finding that “[t]oo
many people have been spied upon by too many Government
agencies and . . . . Government has often undertaken the secret
surveillance of citizens on the basis of their political beliefs,
even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or illegal
acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power.”116 The Church Committee recommended a strict and careful separation of domestic
and foreign intelligence gathering, although it recommended
continued surveillance of “hostile foreign intelligence activity.”117 The committee summarized the effects of these intelligence abuses in a 1976 report:
FBI headquarters alone has developed over 500,000 domestic intelligence files, and these have been augmented by additional files at FBI
Field Offices. The FBI opened 65,000 of these domestic intelligence
files in 1972 alone. In fact, substantially more individuals and groups
are subject to intelligence scrutiny than the number of files would appear to indicate, since typically, each domestic intelligence file contains information on more than one individual or group, and this information is readily retrievable through the FBI General Name
Index.
The number of Americans and domestic groups caught in the domestic intelligence net is further illustrated by the following statistics:
•

Nearly a quarter of a million first class letters were opened
and photographed in the United States by the CIA between
1953–1973, producing a CIA computerized index of nearly
one and one-half million names.

•

At least 130,000 first class letters were opened and photographed by the FBI between 1940–1966 in eight U.S. cities.

•

Some 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA computer
system and separate files were created on approximately
7,200 Americans and over 100 domestic groups during the
course of CIA’s Operation CHAOS (1967–1973).

•

Millions of private telegrams sent from, to, or through the
United States were obtained by the National Security
Agency from 1947 to 1975 under a secret arrangement with
three United States telegraph companies.

•

An estimated 100,000 Americans were the subjects of United
States Army intelligence files created between the mid1960’s and 1971.

116. 2 SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755,
at 5 (1976).
117. Id.
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•

Intelligence files on more than 11,000 individuals and
groups were created by the Internal Revenue Service between 1969 and 1973 and tax investigations were started on
the basis of political rather than tax criteria.

•

At least 26,000 individuals were at one point catalogued on
an FBI list of persons to be rounded up in the event of a “national emergency.”118

The Committee elaborated:
Since the 1930’s, intelligence agencies have frequently wiretapped
and bugged American citizens without the benefit of a judicial warrant. . . . The application of vague and elastic standards for wiretapping and bugging has resulted in electronic surveillances which, by
any objective measure, were improper and seriously infringed the
Fourth Amendment Rights of both the targets and those with whom
the targets communicated. The inherently intrusive nature of electronic surveillance, moreover, has enabled the Government to generate vast amounts of information—unrelated to any legitimate government interest—about the personal and political lives of American
citizens. . . . Also formidable . . . is the ‘chilling effect’ which warrantless electronic surveillance may have on the constitutional rights
of those who were not targets of the surveillance, but who perceived
themselves, whether reasonably or unreasonably, as potential targets.119

Watergate, the Church Committee and other investigative
reports emboldened Congress to control executive overreaching
in its use of surveillance. According to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, the bill that became FISA was “designed . . . to
curb the practice by which the Executive Branch may conduct
warrantless electronic surveillance on its own unilateral determination that national security justifies it,” but to authorize
the use of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence
information.120 Civil liberties groups, such as the ACLU, worried that if Congress set a wiretap standard too low, it could
end up “authorizing rather than curtailing intelligence agency
abuses.”121 In other words, would no legislation be better for
118. Id. at 6–7.
119. S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 8 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3904, 3909.
120. Id. at 8–9.
121. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977: Hearing on H.R.
5794, H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308, H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H.
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 92 (1978) (statement of
John H.F. Shattuck, Executive Director, ACLU, Wash. Office), available at
http://www.cnss.org/fisa011078.pdf [hereinafter FISA Hearing]; see also
Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background
and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 793, 808–11 (1989) (discussing the compromises made between
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civil liberties than bad legislation? At the same time, Congress
recognized that “no persons should be targeted for electronic
surveillance unless the Government has evidence they are engaging in criminal conduct which directly threatens national
security,”122 even though evidence of national security crimes
could be collected during the electronic surveillance. While this
suspicion of criminal activity was an essential part of what
would become the FISA provisions that apply to United States
citizens, Congress did not intend for FISA to authorize surveillance for the purpose of enforcing the criminal laws.123 Congress understood that intelligence gathering and law enforcement would overlap, and that congressional oversight could
monitor the uses of FISA-ordered evidence in criminal prosecutions.124
After six years of hearings and discussion and through the
stewardship of Attorneys General Edward Levi and Griffin
Bell, Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, and several
members of the House and Senate, FISA became law in
1978.125 In his signing statement, President Carter said:
The bill requires, for the first time, a prior judicial warrant for all
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
purposes in the United States in which communications of U.S. persons might be intercepted. It clarifies the Executive’s authority to
gather foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance in the United
States. It will remove any doubt about the legality of those surveillances which are conducted to protect our country against espionage
and international terrorism. It will assure FBI field agents and others
involved in intelligence collection that their acts are authorized by
statute and, if a U.S. person’s communications are concerned, by a
court order. And it will protect the privacy of the American people.
In short, the act helps to solidify the relationship of trust between
the American people and their Government. It provides a basis for the
trust of the American people in the fact that the activities of their intelligence agencies are both effective and lawful. It provides enough
secrecy to ensure that intelligence relating to national security can be
securely acquired, while permitting review by the courts and Congress to safeguard the rights of Americans and others.126

proponents and opponents of national security electronic surveillance legislation).
122. FISA Hearing, supra note 121, at 92.
123. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1160.
124. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, S. REP.
NO. 98-660, at 14 (1984).
125. Id. at 1.
126. JIMMY CARTER, STATEMENT ON SIGNING S. 1566 INTO LAW 1853–54
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FISA’s authorization of electronic surveillance of “foreign
powers” and their agents, terms taken from the Supreme Court
in Keith reflects the Act’s focus on foreign intelligence.127 From
the beginning, the definition of “foreign power” has included “a
group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.”128 An “agent of a foreign power” included a
person who “knowingly engages in sabotage or international
terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor, for or
on behalf of a foreign power.”129 The term “foreign intelligence
information” was defined as:
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect
against—
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or
network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory
that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary
to—
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.130

Non-United States persons (someone not a citizen or permanent resident, among others) could be an “agent of a foreign
power” by being an officer or employee of a foreign power, or a
member of an international terrorist organization.131 The government could target United States persons as agents only if
they knowingly engaged in certain activities, including international terrorism which “involve or may involve a violation of the
criminal statutes of the United States.”132
The FISA process authorizes “electronic surveillance,”
which is broadly defined and must fall within one of four categories:
(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveil(1978), http://www.cnss.org/Carter.pdf.
127. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 308, 321–22
(1972).
128. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4) (2000).
129. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(C).
130. Id. § 1801(e).
131. Id. § 1801(b)(1)(A).
132. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(A).
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lance device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent
by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States
person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances
in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes;
(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire communication to or from a
person in the United States, without the consent of any party thereto,
if such acquisition occurs in the United States, but does not include
the acquisition of those communications of computer trespassers that
would be permissible under section 2511(2)(i) of title 18;
(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or
other surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication,
under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located
within the United States; or
(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.133

The definition excludes electronic surveillance of communications taking place entirely abroad, but it reaches wire or radio communications sent by or intended to be received by a targeted United States person, and those to or from any person
within the United States without the consent of one party,
where the interception occurs inside the United States.134 In
the event of a question concerning whether FISA applies to a
particular form or use of electronic surveillance, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated in 1977 that “this statute, not any
claimed presidential power, controls.”135
In return for subjecting the executive branch to regulation
of its electronic surveillance activities, FISA does not provide
the traditional protections against government abuse of its
electronic surveillance in enforcing the criminal laws.136 FISA
133. Id. § 1801(f ).
134. Id. § 1801(f )(1)–(2).
135. S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 64 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3904, 3965. The House Conference Report noted that the “exclusive” provision
“does not foreclose a different decision by the Supreme Court.” H.R. REP. NO.
95-1720, at 35 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048,
4064.
136. For example, targets of law enforcement surveillance must be given
notice of the surveillance within ninety days of its termination. Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat.
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put in place a much more government-friendly process. Instead
of a neutral magistrate finding probable cause to believe that a
particular crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed
and then issuing a warrant that is later noticed to the target,137
FISA authorizes a special court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), that meets in secret, ex parte.138 To
permit electronic surveillance without the target ever learning
that she was a target, based on a showing that pursuit of foreign intelligence is a significant purpose of the surveillance,
and that there is probable cause to believe that the target is a
foreign power or agent of a foreign power.139
The target may eventually learn of the FISA targeting only
if the FISA surveillance is used by the government in a criminal or other proceeding against him before its use against the
target.140 Only the judge reviewing the lawfulness of the surveillance sees the surveillance logs, in camera.141 Applications
to the FISC must pass through layers of review inside the Justice Department and obtain the approval of the Attorney General.142 The order must describe in some detail the targets of
197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2000)). Criminal defendants routinely obtain access to the application for surveillance, supporting
affidavits, surveillance logs, and statements from informants. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(9).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 2518.
138. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000).
139. The FISC grew from seven to eleven judges with enactment of the Patriot Act. See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 208, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)). If the government does not prevail before the FISC, it may appeal to a three-judge FISA Court of Review. 50
U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2000).
140. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802(a)(3), 1806(f )–(g) (2000). FISC does not publish its
decisions, its orders are sealed, proceedings are ex parte. See id. § 1806(f ).
141. Id. § 1806(f ). A reviewing court reviews the materials ex parte and in
camera and only discloses them to the defendant “where disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance.” Id.
If the Attorney General files a claim of privilege in a pending proceeding
against the target of FISA surveillance, the targets of surveillance may not be
able to examine materials related to the surveillance. Id. A district court may
review FISC-ordered surveillance and may overturn a nondisclosure decision
if the certifications of compliance with FISA requirements are clearly erroneous. Id. No court has ordered disclosure. Id.; see also, e.g., ACLU Found. of S.
Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 469–71 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining why district
courts rarely overturn nondisclosure decisions).
142. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2); see also Piette & Radack, supra note 109, at
460 (“‘[T]he FBI played a much stronger role in reviewing and drafting cases’
and . . . ‘there were some 25 layers of review at the Bureau before the Director
signed off on [an] application and it came back to our office for AG approval
. . . .’”) (quoting a former Justice department lawyer).
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the surveillance and the places where surveillance will occur.143
Time limits are set for the surveillance, although there are opportunities to extend the time.144 Also, once the statutory findings are made by the FISC, the judge “shall” issue the surveillance order.145
To reduce the chance that FISA surveillance could interfere with the rights of U.S. persons, FISA requires “minimization procedures” that the Attorney General must adopt in order
to curtail acquisition and retention and prohibit dissemination
of nonpublic information about U.S. persons.146 In essence,
FISA forbids disclosing information obtained from FISA surveillance except as provided in the minimization procedures,147
although “information that is evidence of a crime which has
been, is being, or is about to be committed can be retained or
disseminated for law enforcement purposes.”148
To underscore that Congress intended this new scheme to
replace entirely the previously unregulated electronic surveillance practices of the executive branch, federal law includes a
provision stating that its procedures, along with those prescribing rules for law enforcement surveillance, provide the “exclusive means” of engaging in electronic surveillance.149 The provision also clarified that the exclusivity provision does not cover
other foreign electronic surveillance conducted abroad, including any such surveillance that targets U.S. persons.150 Another
FISA provision makes it a crime to conduct electronic surveillance “except as authorized by statute.”151
FISA also includes authorization for surveillance outside
the FISA process for up to one year when directed solely at
“communications transmitted by means of communications
used exclusively between or among foreign powers” and there is
“no substantial likelihood” that communication involving a U.S.
person will be acquired.152 However, this is a narrow exception
143. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(c)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 1A 2006).
144. Id. § 1805(e).
145. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2000).
146. Id. §§ 1801(h)(1), 1805(a)(4).
147. Id. § 1806(a).
148. Id. § 1801(h)(3). Problems of minimization and prosecution are considered infra notes 515–50 and accompanying text.
149. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f ) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
150. Id.
151. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (2000).
152. Id. § 1802(a)(1). The effects of new technology on FISA are addressed
infra Part IV.A.
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to the default FISA processes. Because this exception for programmatic surveillance is allowed only for direct foreign government communications, it does not allow surveillance outside
the FISA process when foreign powers use public communications networks. Congress built into law two other exceptions to
the exclusivity of the FISA process gathering for foreign intelligence. One section permits surveillance outside FISA for up to
fifteen days following a declaration of war,153 and the other
permits the Attorney General to certify that “an emergency
situation exists” that requires electronic surveillance before an
order from the FISC could be obtained.154 The emergency authority may be exercised for up to seventy-two hours from the
time authorization is made by the Attorney General, until the
information sought is obtained, or until the FISC denies the
application for surveillance, whichever is earlier.155 The emergency procedures still demand an application to a judge, but it
is not required until seventy-two hours after the emergency authorization.156
Although the scheme was complex, the compromise struck
a fundamental balance. Those most worried about the abuses of
past presidents and their subordinates took comfort in the
regulation of foreign intelligence surveillance that involved Article III judges, albeit to a limited extent. The secrecy, ex parte
proceedings, and corresponding lack of notice to the targets was
troubling, but at least the procedures were prescribed by law.
From the executive branch and intelligence investigators’ perspectives, what was done in the past on the basis of supposed
inherent constitutional authority was now subject to rules imposed by Congress, but once learned and followed, the rules
lent legitimacy to secret surveillance.
II. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
PRACTICE UP TO SEPTEMBER 11
Between 1978 and the early 1990’s, FISA operated to the
satisfaction of the principally involved institutions, and it
changed only incrementally. FISA applications grew in number
during this period, although the growth was modest until 1995
(following the first World Trade Center and Oklahoma City
153.
154.
155.
156.

50 U.S.C. § 1811.
Id. § 1805(f )(1).
Id. § 1805(f ).
Id.
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bombings), when the number of annual orders doubled from the
early years, to about one thousand by 2001.157 The executive
branch could hardly complain—it always, or nearly always, got
what it wanted when it made an application to the FISC.158 Inside the Justice Department, the FBI was required to change
the way it had always operated, and it did so primarily through
the promulgation and implementation of sets of guidelines, first
issued by Attorney General Edward Levi in 1976.159 The FBI
guidelines, revised by successive administrations, followed the
FISA strictures and supplied more detail for investigations, including those outside the triggering language of FISA.160
Meanwhile, federal courts upheld FISA against constitutional
challenges and supported the use of FISA surveillance as evidence in criminal cases after finding that the “primary purpose” of the surveillance was to gather foreign intelligence.161
In addition, the Justice Department created a central
gatekeeper for all FISA applications, the Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review (OIPR). OIPR was assigned to represent the
United States before the FISC and to ensure institutional responsibility for FISA compliance,162 allowing FISA expertise to
157. Until expanded reporting requirements were required beginning in
2005, brief annual reports of FISA activity were provided by the Attorney
General, including the volume of applications approved for the year. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa (follow “FISA Annual Reports to Congress” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
The reports show an average of five hundred to six hundred requests in the
1980s and early 1990s before an increase after 1995. See id. The more recent
reporting requirements are addressed infra 325–327.
158. After more than twenty years, only two FISA applications had been
rejected. In 1981, the FISC ruled that it had no jurisdiction to approve an application for a physical search for national security purposes. In re the Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential
Premises and Personal Property (F.I.S.C. 1981), as reprinted in S. REP. NO. 97280, at 16–19 (1981). In 1997, an application for electronic surveillance was
rejected “with leave to amend,” but the government did not pursue the matter.
Supreme Court Rebuffs FISA Challenge, SECRECY NEWS, Apr. 23, 2001, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2001/04/042301.html.
159. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SEC. AND TERRORISM OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97th CONG., THE DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATION GUIDELINES 51–64 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter DOMESTIC SECURITY
GUIDELINES]. For a review of these and subsequent versions of the guidelines,
see STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 617–27 (4th ed. 2007).
160. See DOMESTIC SECURITY GUIDELINES, supra note 159.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991);
United States v. Rahman, 861 F. Supp. 247, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff ’d, 189
F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999).
162. See Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, http://www.fas.org/irp/
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develop inside the Department. Their office sought to make
FISA applications detailed and complete.163 When OIPR delivered applications to the FISC, the Department could represent
that it sought electronic surveillance in pursuit of a “foreign intelligence” purpose, not to spy on political enemies or to endrun the magistrate in building a criminal case.164
As the federal courts admitted FISA-obtained evidence in
criminal prosecutions after finding that the primary purpose of
the investigation was to collect foreign intelligence, OIPR performed its gatekeeping role to assure that the Department of
Justice followed FISA procedures. Under OIPR head Mary
Lawton, who ran OIPR from 1982 until her sudden death in
1993, OIPR operated without written guidelines.165 Although
Lawton believed that some things were better “left undefined,”
she and OIPR made sure that the intelligence and law enforcement personnel regularly consulted one another.166 The
9/11 Commission Report and an Inspector General’s report on
the FBI and intelligence related to the September 11 attacks
concluded that, from the inception of FISA through the early
1990’s, “prosecutors had informal arrangements for obtaining
information gathered in the FISA process,”167 and that “prosecutors within the Department’s Criminal Division . . . had to be
consulted in connection with intelligence investigations in
which federal criminal activity was uncovered, or when legal
advice was needed to avoid investigative steps that might inadvertently jeopardize the option of prosecution using information
obtained from the intelligence investigation.”168
Gradually, the insistence of OIPR and the FISC on fulsome
FISA applications resulted in more elaborate procedures, including those that separated law enforcement and intelligence
agents and activities.169 Although implementation of the FISA
purpose requirement was to some extent responsible for develagency/doj/oipr/index.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
163. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 531, 535 (2006).
164. Id.
165. See Piette & Radack, supra note 109, at 449–52.
166. Id. at 451–52.
167. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 78 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
168. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF
THE FBI’S HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RELATED TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 24 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 OIG REPORT].
169. Id. at 25–27.
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oping what evolved into a “wall,” to a large degree the barriers
between successful intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and sharing were due to a perennially cumbersome FBI
bureaucracy, an equally bad FBI computer system, and a culture inside the Criminal Division and intelligence sides of the
FBI that simply nurtured separation.170
For several years, the OIPR role in managing the FISA
process evolved without major incidents.171 However, during
the Aldrich Ames espionage prosecution in 1994, back-channel
cooperation between the CIA and FBI prompted OIPR to advise
the Attorney General that the close CIA/FBI collaboration in
the Ames investigation could provide Ames’ lawyers with an
argument that the FISA warrants were misused.172 Ames accepted a plea bargain, so no test of the OIPR concern was presented to a judge.173 Still, the Justice Department was put on
notice that back-channel consultations between its intelligence
and law enforcement officials could be problematic.
Inside the Justice Department, Deputy Attorney General
Jamie Gorelick convened a working group to reconcile emerging
differences of opinion between OIPR, the Criminal Division,
and FBI over “wall” issues.174 The working group sought an
opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) on the question
of whether the FISC could approve a search under FISA only
when the collection of foreign intelligence was the “primary
purpose” of the search, or whether it sufficed that such collection was one of the purposes.175 In February 1995, the OLC
“concluded that ‘“courts are more likely to adopt the ‘primary
purpose’ test than any less stringent formulation.”’”176 Based on
170. Schulhofer, supra note 163, at 535–36 (“FISA’s ‘purpose’ requirement
was a seed from which increasingly intricate obstacles developed. Yet the resulting problems were not inevitable, even under the law as it stood before
9/11; most of the difficulties could have been avoided with better training,
more common sense, and more willingness to tolerate ambiguity and decentralized discretion.”).
171. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 78.
172. Id.
173. STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 665 (2d ed. 1997).
174. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 79.
175. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REVIEW TEAM ON THE HANDLING OF THE LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY INVESTIGATION 720 (May 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/
readingroom/bellows.htm [hereinafter BELLOWS REPORT].
176. Implementation of the USA PATRIOT ACT: Section 218—Foreign Intelligence Information (“The Wall”): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
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the FISA case law, OLC determined that “the greater the involvement of prosecutors in the planning and execution of FISA
searches, the greater is the chance that the government could
not assert in good faith that the ‘primary purpose’ was the collection of foreign intelligence.”177 OLC thus recommended that
“an appropriate internal process” should be established “that
FISA certifications are consistent with the ‘primary purpose’
test.”178
Meanwhile, to assure that misuse of FISA did not occur,
OIPR began imposing information-sharing controls on its own
initiative.179 The working group made recommendations to
Deputy Attorney General Gorelick, who in turn submitted them
to Attorney General Reno.180 In March 1995,181 Gorelick wrote
a memorandum prescribing special “wall” procedures for two
pending cases, including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
prosecution.182 The memorandum instructed that the intelligence investigation in the New York case would go forward
“without any direction or control”183 by the U.S. Attorney’s office or the Criminal Division, and it required FBI headquarters
or OIPR approval to share some portions of intelligence investigative memoranda with law enforcement agents.184 In addition to these “wall” procedures, the March memorandum also
encouraged cooperation and coordination between the intelligence and law enforcement personnel in a few particular
ways.185 According to a 2004 Office of the Inspector General report, the March memorandum from Gorelick was somehow
misconstrued and its “wall” procedures were applied through-

Cong. 17–34 (2005) (statement of David S. Kris, Senior Vice President, Time
Warner Inc.), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/kris042805
.pdf.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 78.
180. Id. at 79.
181. See id. at 539 n.83 (stating that Jamie Gorelick authored the memo to
Mary Jo White in March, 1995).
182. See Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney Gen., to
Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y., et al. 1–4 (Mar. 1995) [hereinafter Gorelick Memo] (regarding “Instructions on Separation of Certain Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations”), available at http://www.usdoj
.gov/ag/testimony/2004/1995_gorelick_memo.pdf.
183. Id. at 3.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 2–3.
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out the FBI for all FISA applications by 1997.186 Notably, the
restrictive procedures in the Gorelick memorandum exceeded
any requirements imposed by FISA or case law.187
Then, in July 1995, Attorney General Janet Reno issued a
set of secret internal guidelines to prescribe procedures for contacts among the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, the
FBI, and OIPR.188 Contacts between the prosecutors and their
investigators and intelligence officials were limited, logged, and
noted to the OIPR.189 These entities could exchange
consultations and advice, but the contacts should “not inadvertently result in either the fact or the appearance of the Criminal Division’s directing or controlling” an investigation.190 The
guidelines were not written to affect contacts and informationsharing between investigating agents—internal to the Criminal
Division or between criminal and intelligence investigators—
but instead were intended to apply only between investigators
and prosecutors.191
According to a later Office of the Inspector General Report,
the OIPR lawyers almost immediately misconstrued and misapplied the 1995 guidelines as containing the special procedures imposed in New York by the March Gorelick memorandum, thus interpreting FISA as essentially prohibiting contact
between the law enforcement and intelligence sides of an investigation.192 Coordination between law enforcement and intelligence officials that had occurred before 1995 fell off after issuance of the guidelines, and such contacts that did occur came so
186. See 2004 OIG REPORT, supra note 168, at 31.
187. See Gorelick Memo, supra note 182, at 2 (explaining that the recommended procedures “go beyond what is legally required”).
188. See Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney Gen., to Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., et al. (July 19, 1995) (regarding “Procedures for
Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations”), available at http://
www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1995procs.html.
189. See id.
190. Id. pt. A.6.
191. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 79; see also LAWRENCE
WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11, at 343
(2006) (“The Justice Department promulgated a new policy in 1995 designed
to regulate the exchange of information between agents and criminal prosecutors, but not among the agents themselves.”).
192. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 79 (“[The] procedures
were almost immediately misunderstood and misapplied.”); 2004 OIG REPORT,
supra note 168, at 33; WRIGHT, supra note 191, at 343 (“Bureaucratic confusion and inertia allowed the policy to gradually choke off the flow of essential
information . . . .”).
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late in the process as to be practically useless.193 Although not
required by FISA, a metaphorical “wall” between law enforcement and intelligence gathering was thus put in place whenever an intelligence investigation suggested some indication of
criminal activity.194 The FBI then developed a parallel system
of “dirty” teams for gathering intelligence and “clean” teams for
criminal law enforcement.195 The teams could investigate the
same target at the same time, but they rarely talked with one
another.196
OIPR maintained its gatekeeper role throughout this period—only through it would information pass to the Criminal
Division. According to the 9/11 Commission, OIPR sustained its
position in part by maintaining it reflected the concerns of the
chief judge of the FISC, and that “if it could not regulate the
flow of information to criminal prosecutors, it would no longer
present the FBI’s warrant requests to the FISA Court.”197 Although the OIPR FISA procedures were revised between 1995
and 2002 to permit consultation between the intelligence and
prosecution sides of the FBI “aimed at preserving the option of
criminal prosecution,” the Criminal Division was not allowed to
“direct or control the FISA investigation.”198 During this period,
the FISC approved the OIPR procedures and issued casespecific information screening walls.199 These mechanisms varied with the complexity of the investigation, and sometimes
saw the FISC serving as the “wall” between the two sides.200 In
1999, a badly managed espionage investigation of Los Alamos

193. See Hearing, supra note 15, at 49.
194. See WRIGHT, supra note 191, at 343 (characterizing the FISC as the
“arbiter of what information could be shared—‘thrown over the Wall’”).
195. Roberto Suro, FBI’s “Clean” Team Follows “Dirty” Work of Intelligence,
WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1999, at A13.
196. Id.; see also Hearing, supra note 15, at 49–50 (describing the guidelines as leading to decreased coordination on intelligence cases); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FBI INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: COORDINATION
WITHIN JUSTICE ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CRIMINAL MATTERS IS LIMITED 4
(2001) (“[The] implementation and interpretation of the procedures . . . led to a
significant decline in coordination between the FBI and the Criminal Division.”).
197. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 79.
198. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 729; In re All Matters Submitted to
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 619 (FISA
Ct. 2002), abrogated by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717.
199. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 539 n.83.
200. See id.
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National Laboratory scientist Wen Ho Lee201 led the Attorney
General to appoint a commission to review the Lee investigation, including the apparent failure to take advantage of FISA
procedures.202 The investigation found that the FBI should
have sought and obtained FISA surveillance of Lee, and that
OIPR insisted that the Justice Department have more evidence
of foreign agency than FISA requires.203
III. THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 CHANGES
The euphemism that “everything changed”204 after the
September 11 attacks probably exaggerates less what happened to FISA than to most other pre-attack authorities in the
counter-terrorism area. Critics of the Patriot Act who do not
know its lineage often complain that the massive bill and its
many controversial amendments to FISA and to other laws was
rushed through Congress by the Bush administration and that
members only hastily and cursorily reviewed the bill in the
seven weeks between its introduction and enactment.205 Although the rush to judgment in Congress was real, the Justice
Department had drafts of portions of what would become the
Patriot Act prepared and waiting before the September 11 attacks—the hijackers provided the political atmosphere needed
to provide favorable consideration of some significant changes
in the law.206 Still, no committee reports accompanied the Pa-

201. See Bob Drogin, How FBI’s Flawed Case Against Lee Unraveled, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2000, at 1.
202. See BELLOWS REPORT, supra note 175, at 14–15.
203. See id. at 482–83, 497.
204. See, e.g., Editorial, “The Day That Everything Changed,” L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2001, at 8 (stating that September 11 was “the day that everything
changed in our country”).
205. See Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT
Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1145, 1145–46 (2004); id. at 1151–52 (noting “the
dangers inherent in the haste to legislate” and that on September 17, 2001,
Attorney General Ashcroft called for Congress to pass the administration’s unseen and not completely drafted bill that week); see also Clayton Northouse,
Interview with U.S. Senator Russ Feingold, April 21, 2004, in PROTECTING
WHAT MATTERS: TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY AND LIBERTY SINCE 9/11 72, 72–80
(Clayton Northouse ed., 2006) (interviewing Sen. Russ Feingold, the only senator to vote against the Patriot Act).
206. See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE
WAR ON TERROR 71 (2006) (stating that career lawyers at the Justice Department developed a “wish list” of proposals for the Patriot Act from provisions
not passed when Congress enacted antiterrorism legislation in 1996).
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triot Act describing and explaining any fundamental rethinking
of the basic terms of the FISA compromise of interests.207
Two developments merit special attention because, taken
together, they portend the death of FISA—one section of the
Patriot Act208 with its implementation by the FISA Court of
Review and the NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP).
A. THE COLLAPSE OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSE
RULE
Until amended by the Patriot Act, FISA required that an
application to the FISC for electronic surveillance had to include a certification that “the purpose of the surveillance is to
obtain foreign intelligence information.”209 As interpreted by
the federal courts between FISA’s implementation and 2001, in
practice the rule was that the “primary purpose” of the FISA
surveillance must be to obtain foreign intelligence.210 If and
when a law enforcement purpose became dominant in an investigation, FISA required that traditional criminal investigative
rules be followed in order to continue the surveillance.211
In enacting FISA, Congress understood that, in many
situations, intelligence and law enforcement investigators work
side-by-side and that information collected in intelligence gathering becomes evidence in an eventual criminal proceeding.212
In the aggregate, however, foreign intelligence gathering is
programmatic, rather than targeting specific individuals for
known or anticipated crimes.213 Intelligence investigations often continue long after a completed criminal act has been
prosecuted.214 In addition, the product of foreign intelligence
investigations may, at any point in time, appear fragmented

207. See Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil
Liberties, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 175, 227 (2003) (stating that no committee reports accompanied the Patriot Act).
208. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of
2001 § 218 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B)).
209. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000) (current version at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1804(a)(7)(B) (Supp. I 2003)).
210. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1159.
211. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir.
1980).
212. Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 4.
213. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1152.
214. Id.
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and hard to evaluate to someone in law enforcement.215 The
culture of criminal investigations, including the legal standards
of particularity, criminality, and eventual notice to the target,
has no parallel in the world of foreign intelligence gathering.216
The intelligence gathering and law enforcement spheres
overlapped in 1978, and they overlap to a greater extent now.217
Intelligence investigations turn up leads that provide the
criminal investigators what they need to make a case.218 The
criminal enforcement team may gain intelligence during the
course of their surveillance or in an interrogation.219 However,
as counter-terrorism officials recognized the value of collaboration between intelligence and law enforcement investigators,
they also confronted formidable institutional—not legal—
resistance.220 The tension between the need for secrecy and the
demand to share information is inevitable, long-standing, and
entrenched.221 From the intelligence side, leaks are anathema,
and compromised sources have no value.222 Criminal investigators and prosecutors work assiduously to avoid tainting prosecution evidence through contact with intelligence officials
whose knowledge could render critical evidence inadmissible.223
The law requires the use of law enforcement investigative procedures if the sole purpose of surveillance is prosecution, and it
permits FISA procedures if the purpose of the investigation is
the collection of foreign intelligence.224 To some extent, the
“wall” procedures grew out of concern for preserving these baseline rules.225 By and large, however, the separate institutional
responsibilities and concerns are reflected in the separate divi215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See infra notes 291–95 and accompanying text.
218. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 4.
219. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 424.
220. See id. at 79 (describing the barriers to information-sharing as the
“wall”).
221. See MARK M. LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM SECRETS TO POLICY
18 (3d ed. 2006).
222. See Jonathan M. Fredman, Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement
and the Prosecution Team, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 331, 337–38 (1998).
223. See id.; WRIGHT, supra note 191, at 205 (“[FBI personnel] tended to be
close-mouthed and unhelpful, treating all intelligence as potential evidence
that couldn’t be compromised, whether there was an actual criminal case or
not.”).
224. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 78.
225. See id. at 79 (describing the “wall” as an accumulation of “institutional
beliefs and practices”).
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sions for criminal and national security investigations inside
the FBI, and they show that the “wall” is much more grounded
in cultural or institutional matters than it is in legal concerns.226 The institutional differences, rivalries, and bureaucracies transcend the FBI and include the CIA and NSA, before
and after September 11.227
When the failures in information-sharing and cooperation
surrounding the September 11 hijackers came to light,228 the
Bush administration determined to lower the supposed barriers
and turn loose all the investigative resources available in a
paradigm of prevention229 to complement prosecution and other
means of combating terrorism. Initially, the Justice Department proposed an amendment that would have replaced FISA’s
certification requirement that “the purpose” of surveillance was
to obtain foreign intelligence with “‘a’ purpose.”230 According to
the Department, the change “would eliminate the current need
continually to evaluate the relative weight of criminal and intelligence purposes, and would facilitate information sharing
between law enforcement and foreign intelligence authorities.”231 Even in the short time given to consider the proposal,
members objected that the “a purpose” standard would open
the door for virtually unlimited use of FISA in criminal investigations, where foreign intelligence is only remotely connected

226. See WRIGHT, supra note 191, at 242 (“[T]he two men most responsible
for putting a stop to bin Laden and al-Qaeda . . . disliked each other intensely
. . . . From the start, the response of American intelligence to the challenge
presented by al-Qaeda was hampered by the dismal personal relationships
and institutional warfare that these men exemplified.”).
227. Id. at 283 (stating that after the African embassy bombings, the NSA
monitored satellite phone calls of senior al Qaeda leaders, but refused to share
the raw data with the FBI, CIA, or White House counter-terrorism officials);
id. at 312 (noting that the CIA distrusted the senior FBI official and feared
that the FBI “was too blundering and indiscriminate to be trusted with sensitive intelligence”); id. at 314–15, 340–42 (noting that the CIA knew the 9/11
hijackers in the United States but that the CIA did not share that information
with the FBI); id. at 343 (suggesting that the CIA and NSA restricted
information-sharing after “eagerly institutionaliz[ing]” the “wall”).
228. Two of the suspected 9/11 hijackers had been on a CIA watch list, but
the CIA informed the FBI only after they entered the United States. Guy Gugliotta, Terrorism “Watch List” Was No Match for Hijackers, WASH. POST, Sept.
23, 2001, at A22.
229. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET, supra note 6.
230. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 2001, SECTION-BYSECTION ANALYSIS (2001), available at http://www.eff.org/Censorship/
Terrorism_militias/20010919_doj_ata_analysis.html.
231. Id.
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to the investigation.232 Even a Justice Department FISA expert
admitted that the proposed amendment to the purpose language had less to do with what information could be collected
than with facilitating coordination between intelligence and
law enforcement after collection.233 Senator Leahy then proposed a new provision to facilitate information sharing, independent of the purpose certification and the administration
agreed to his proposal.234 The new section was enacted and it
permits those who acquire foreign intelligence by conducting
electronic surveillance to “consult with Federal law enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect
against” terrorist activities by foreign powers or their agents.235
During the course of the Congressional debate, members
and outside experts questioned the constitutionality of the
change to “a” purpose, from “the” or “primary” purpose.236 Al232. Beryl A. Howell, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Has the Solution Become the Problem?, in PROTECTING WHAT MATTERS: TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY, AND LIBERTY SINCE 9/11 118, 124 (Clayton Northouse ed., 2006).
233. Protecting Constitutional Freedoms in the Face of Terrorism: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 65 (2001) [hereinafter Protecting
Constitutional Freedoms] (testimony of David S. Kris, Assoc. Deputy Att’y
Gen.); see also S. 1448, The Intelligence to Prevent Terrorism Act of 2001 and
Other Legislative Proposals in the Wake of the September 11, 2001 Attacks:
Hearing before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 21 (2001)
[hereinafter Intelligence to Prevent Terrorism Act] (testimony of David S. Kris,
Assoc.iate Deputy Att’y Gen.) (“[T]he administration’s proposal [is] designed to
foster and facilitate greater coordination between the law enforcement and the
intelligence sides of the Government.”).
234. See Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary
Comm., and Democratic Manager of the Senate Debate on the Anti-Terrorism
Bill (Oct. 25, 2001), http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200110/102501.html.
235. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 504(a), 115 Stat. 272, 364–65 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1806(k), 1825(k)). The Act states that such coordination “shall not preclude”
the required FISA certification. Id.; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000)
(requiring certification that “a significant purpose” of the surveillance requested is to obtain foreign intelligence).
236. See Protecting Constitutional Freedoms, supra note 233, at 45–46
(statement of Morton Halperin, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations);
Intelligence to Prevent Terrorism Act, supra note 233, at 44–45 (2001)
(prepared statement of Jeffrey H. Smith, Partner, Arnold & Porter) (arguing
that the “Committee should be careful in endorsing [the change to ‘a’ purpose]
because it holds out the potential that the government would seek FISA surveillance warrants—when it didn’t have enough information to get a Title III
order—but in which the foreign intelligence information to be obtained was
remote or highly speculative”). But see Homeland Defense: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 24–25 (2001) [hereinafter Homeland
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though the administration stated that it would provide a legal
analysis in support of the proposed change,237 at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Senator Dianne Feinstein urged Attorney General Ashcroft to consider an alternative formulation
of the purpose requirement, to “substantial or significant purpose” rather than to “a purpose.”238 The Attorney General
agreed to support a slight change in the proposal,239 and the
eventual Patriot Act amended FISA to provide that obtaining
foreign intelligence must be “a significant purpose” of the surveillance.240
During the floor debate Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Patrick Leahy acknowledged that “[p]rotection
against these foreign-based threats by any lawful means is
within the scope of the definition of ‘foreign intelligence information,’ and the use of FISA to gather evidence for the enforcement of these laws was contemplated in the enactment of
FISA.”241 Senator Dianne Feinstein also opined that the objective of the change in the purpose language in the Patriot Act
was to make it
easier to collect foreign intelligence information . . . .
. . . [I]n today’s world things are not so simple. In many cases, surveillance will have two key goals—the gathering of foreign intelligence, and the gathering of evidence for a criminal prosecution. . . .
Rather than forcing law enforcement to decide which purpose is
primary . . . this bill strikes a new balance. It will now require that a
“significant” purpose of the investigation must be foreign intelligence
gathering to proceed with surveillance under FISA.
The effect of this provision will be to make it easier for law enforcement to . . . [use FISA] . . . where the subject of the surveillance
is both a potential source of valuable intelligence and the potential
target of a criminal prosecution.242

These comments were embraced later by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) as supporting its
interpretation of the change in the purpose language as to
Defense] (statement of John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen.).
237. Intelligence to Prevent Terrorism Act, supra note 233, at 21–22 (testimony of David S. Kris, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen.).
238. Homeland Defense, supra note 236, at 24–25 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
239. Id. at 25 (statement of John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen.).
240. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. at 291.
241. 147 Cong. Rec. S10,990, S11,004 (2001).
242. Id. at S10,586, S10,591.
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practically eliminate any requirement that the government
show a foreign intelligence purpose in its FISA applications.243
However, the Leahy and Feinstein statements do not fairly reflect an intention, on their part or on the part of Congress as a
whole, to change the overarching requirement of FISA that its
processes be employed in pursuit of foreign intelligence. Senator Leahy simply acknowledged that it had been understood
from the beginning of FISA that information collected under it
could be used in prosecution, and Senator Feinstein noted that
the statutory amendment will make it “easier” to use FISA in
criminal cases, not that the foreign intelligence core of FISA
was eliminated.244
The limited attention to this issue during floor debates and
the lack of committee reports is unfortunate. In the determination to enact the new measures quickly after September 11, the
details and complexities of FISA and careful consideration of
the effects of its amendments were mostly lost on the reformers. From the beginnings of FISA in 1978, however, national
security crimes provided a fusing point between foreign intelligence collection and law enforcement. The wall between the
two types of surveillance thus had an open portal of sorts early
on, and the Patriot Act change in the purpose language eased
its use. In other words, the adjective “significant” has significant meaning in the amended FISA. There was movement of
the standard, but not to such an extent that “a purpose” to collect foreign intelligence would suffice.
As part of a bundle of what some viewed as significant and
controversial changes to existing legislation that the Bush administration effectively rushed through Congress, Congress enacted the purpose amendment and several others subject to a
five-year sunset provision.245 After enactment of the Patriot
Act, the FISC responded to the first FISA applications filed under the revised Act by incorporating the augmented case-bycase 1995 OIPR procedures as formal minimization procedures
that would apply to all future applications to the FISC.246 Undaunted by the FISC order, the Justice Department immediately changed its guidelines to suspend the “chaperone” re243. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 732–33 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
244. See supra notes 241–42 and accompanying text.
245. USA Patriot Act § 224, 115 Stat. at 295.
246. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 729; In re All Matters Submitted to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 619 (FISA Ct.
Rev. 2002), abrogated by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717.
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quirement that OIPR be present during any contacts between
Criminal Division and FBI investigators concerning FISA matters.247 Instead, OIPR and the FISC would thereafter receive
briefings about such meetings.248 More concrete changes came
in March 2002, when new Intelligence Sharing Procedures
were approved by Attorney General Ashcroft.249 The new guidelines removed the information screening procedures and lifted
the restriction that had been formally in place since 1995 on
prosecutors or other law enforcement officials “directing or controlling” the use of FISA surveillance.250 In addition, the new
procedures encouraged complete sharing of information and
advice and emphasized that “[t]he overriding need to protect
the national security from foreign threats compels a full and
free exchange of information and ideas.”251 Prosecutors are expected to have access to all information developed by the FBI in
field intelligence investigations undertaken pursuant to FISA
and prosecutors may advise the FBI about “all issues.”252 Although the Criminal Division, FBI, and OIPR are expected to
meet and consult, OIPR is not required to be present when the
other two meet.253
The new guidelines effectively dismantled the system that
OIPR had in place since 1995. Although the 1995 procedures
had erected information barriers that were not required by
FISA, they assured that FISA was being used for its intended
purpose and protected against tainting criminal cases with evidence obtained for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence.
The Ashcroft guidelines are, like their 1995 predecessor, for the
most part not required by FISA, as amended by the Patriot
Act.254 The new information sharing provision in the Patriot
Act did provide a statutory basis to remove barriers that had
247. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 619.
248. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 729.
249. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 615.
250. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 733–34.
251. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the United States,
Intelligence Sharing Procedures for Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations Conducted by the FBI to Dir. of the FBI, Assistant
Att’y Gen. for the Criminal Div., Counsel for Intelligence Policy, and United
States Attorneys (Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
agency/doj/fisa/ag030602.html (hereinafter March 2002 procedures).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See id.
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existed because of the previous procedures, including elimination of the OIPR as chaperone.255 Although the legislative history surrounding the Patriot Act amendment to the purpose
language does not clearly illuminate its purpose, the apparent
aim was to facilitate information sharing between intelligence
and law enforcement personnel after information is collected
and, to a lesser extent, eliminate the incorrect but widespread
belief that the use of FISA processes could undermine a subsequent or even contemporaneous prosecution.256
The change in the purpose language was really a change in
emphasis only; it did not provide the basis for the elimination
of the “direction or control” restriction on the Criminal Division. That single change in the procedures could be read to
open up just the sort of misuse of FISA that was feared by the
en banc FISC in its 2002 opinion.257 Prosecutors that did not
have grounds for a Title III warrant could urge intelligence investigators to expand their FISA surveillance parameters in
pursuit of a criminal charge.258 With such surveillance in place,
FISA orders permit longer periods of surveillance, easier renewals, and less oversight than Title III.259 The “direction or
control” change was not required by the Patriot Act, and it apparently reflected the Attorney General’s determination to
move vigorously forward with the policy of prevention.
After the Attorney General approved the March 2002 procedures, the Department of Justice submitted a new application for FISA surveillance and, as part of the application,
moved that the FISC vacate its minimization and wall procedures to the extent they are inconsistent with the new OIPR
procedures.260 In May 2002, the FISC issued a decision, joined
by all seven judges of the court, that agreed with the request
255. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 504(a), 115 Stat. 272, 364–65 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1806(k), 1825(k)).
256. See supra Part III, notes 209–28 and accompanying text.
257. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 624–25 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002), abrogated by In re
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
258. Id. at 624.
259. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e) (2000) (allowing surveillance for a
maximum time of ninety days, or one year if surveillance is targeted against a
foreign power), with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2000) (allowing surveillance for a
maximum time of thirty days).
260. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
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for the most part, but that rejected a portion of the new Justice
Department guidelines and ordered new procedures to ensure
the integrity of the underlying foreign intelligence purpose of
FISA investigations.261 The FISC opined that the new Justice
Department procedures “appear to be designed to amend the
law and substitute the FISA for [criminal law enforcement]
electronic surveillances.”262 As the FISC interpreted FISA, the
Justice Department procedures would gut the minimization requirements—designed to minimize the gathering of information
about United States persons and to prevent its dissemination—
if the Criminal Division could so easily use FISA-obtained electronic surveillance, and the Patriot Act did not affect those
minimization requirements.263 Instead of using minimization to
determine the “need of the United States to obtain, produce,
and disseminate foreign intelligence information,”264 the new
OIPR procedures would have the FISC balance the use of FISA
materials “against the government’s need to obtain and use
evidence for criminal prosecution.”265
According to the FISC, the limits it set on the OIPR procedures seek to avoid FISA activities where “criminal prosecutors
direct both the intelligence and criminal investigations . . .
[and] coordination becomes subordination of both investigations
or interests to law enforcement objectives.”266 The court
summed up the implications of the new procedures:
[C]riminal prosecutors will tell the FBI when to use FISA (perhaps
when they lack probable cause for a Title III electronic surveillance),
what techniques to use, what information to look for, what information to keep as evidence and when use of FISA can cease because
there is enough evidence to arrest and prosecute.267

The court feared that under the proposed procedures,
prosecutors would have “every legal advantage conceived by
Congress to be used by U.S. intelligence agencies to collect foreign intelligence information,” including the looser probable
cause standard and “use of the most highly advanced and
highly intrusive techniques for intelligence gathering.”268 The
261. Id. at 626–27.
262. Id. at 623.
263. Id.
264. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(1), 1821(4)(A) (2000).
265. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
266. Id. at 623–24 (emphasis omitted).
267. Id. at 624.
268. Id.
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FISC concluded by striking two paragraphs of the OIPR procedures—those allowing criminal investigators to advise intelligence officials concerning “the initiation, operation, continuation, or expansion of FISA searches or surveillance”—and
putting in their place a rule that law enforcement personnel
should not “direct or control” the use of FISA procedures and a
requirement that contacts between law enforcement and intelligence personnel working on parallel FISA investigations be
monitored by OIPR.269
The three-judge FISA Court of Review abrogated this decision.270 The FISCR harshly repudiated the FISC and wrote that
its decision “not only misinterpreted and misapplied minimization procedures . . . [it] may well have exceeded the constitutional bounds that restrict an Article III court.”271 The FISCR
rejected the idea that there had ever been in FISA any dichotomy between law enforcement and collection of foreign intelligence, before or after the Patriot Act.272 According to the Court
of Review, the simple change to “a significant purpose” by the
Patriot Act removed any cause the FISC may have had to
weigh the government’s relative interests in law enforcement
and foreign intelligence.273 However, the Court also found that
the Patriot Act, to a limited extent, codified such a dichotomy,
and that it must be enforced.274 Only if the government’s “sole
objective” is to obtain evidence of a past crime would the FISC
properly deny an application.275
The FISCR reasoned that, because FISA defines the targets and information sought in close relation to national security criminal activity, any use of the information collected from
FISA surveillance, including prosecution, is permitted.276 However, the fact that “foreign intelligence information includes
evidence of foreign intelligence crimes”277 does not determine
the limits on law enforcement use of FISA materials. Nor does
the use of FISA surveillance for prosecution necessarily invali-

269. Id. at 623, 625 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
270. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 720, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
271. Id. at 731.
272. Id. at 725, 735.
273. Id. at 735.
274. Id. at 734–36.
275. Id. at 735–36 (“[T]he FISA process may not be used to investigate
wholly unrelated ordinary crimes.”).
276. Id. at 731.
277. Id. at 724.
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date the FISA activities. If the gathering of foreign intelligence
is a significant purpose of the surveillance, the later use of
FISA-derived information in a criminal prosecution will not
taint the evidence.278 In short, the FISCR conflated what FISA
information is used for with the purpose for using FISA.279
During the 1980’s and early 1990’s, some of the criminal
convictions and appeals where FISA-derived evidence formed
part of the basis for the prosecution upheld the use of the FISA
evidence after finding that the surveillance was not “directed
towards criminal investigation or the institution of a criminal
prosecution.”280 Indeed, of the courts of appeal that reviewed
FISA-related criminal convictions during this period, only the
Sarkissian court “refuse[d] to draw too fine a distinction” between criminal and intelligence investigations.”281 The others
endorsed the “primary purpose” test and, in doing so, presumed
that a “wall” between the law enforcement and intelligence
sides of an investigation existed.282 However, none of these
courts suppressed evidence and none contradict that in OIPR
and the Justice Department during that period a robust coordination between intelligence and law enforcement officials was
ongoing.283 In short, the purpose requirement existed from the
beginning, but the wall, misapprehended by the FISCR, came
later.
After the sudden death of OIPR head Mary Lawton in
1993, Attorney General Janet Reno turned to her Florida colleague and Assistant U.S. Attorney in Miami, Richard Scruggs,
to head OIPR.284 Scruggs became concerned that there were no
written guidelines governing contacts between the Criminal
278. See supra note 209 (citing decisions upholding the use of FISA procedures and FISA-derived evidence in criminal prosecutions).
279. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, at 49 (1978) (“How this information may
be used ‘to protect’ against clandestine intelligence activities is not prescribed
by the definition of foreign intelligence information . . . . Obviously, use of [foreign intelligence] as evidence in a criminal trial is one way the government
can lawfully protect against . . . international terrorism.”).
280. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 78 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting
United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1190 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)).
281. United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988).
282. See United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991);
United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075–76 (4th Cir. 1987); Duggan, 743
F.2d at 77.
283. See Supplemental Brief for the United States, In re Sealed Case, 310
F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. Sept. 25, 2002) (No. 02-001), available at http://www
.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/092502sup.html.
284. See DOJ Moves, 8 DOJ ALERT 11 (May 2, 1994).
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Division and the intelligence side of FBI, and, upon discovering
that a warrantless physical search on the home of Aldrich
Ames had been conducted, he worried that the “primary purpose” analysis could be applied and thus compromise the criminal espionage case against Ames.285 Soon, Scruggs began imposing information-sharing procedures for FISA materials on
his own.286
Scruggs wrote a series of memoranda advocating guidelines for the separation of intelligence and criminal investigations, and in one of them he referred to his recommended procedures as establishing a “Chinese wall.”287 Thus, the origins of
the 1995 guidelines and wall procedures that followed between
then and 2002, reviewed above, were not, as the FISCR
claimed, “shrouded in historical mist.”288 Nor did the wall’s construction inside the Justice Department necessarily mean that
FISA needed a statutory fix.
During his argument before the FISCR, Solicitor Ted Olson
noted that when it comes to the meaning of the Patriot Act
amendments to FISA, “we’re not dealing with perfect clarity
here.”289 Still, although the plain meaning of the amendment
favors greater involvement by the Criminal Division in FISA
investigations and more merged law enforcement and foreign
intelligence investigations, the text does not support a construction that allows the Criminal Division to direct and control the FISA activities pertinent to an investigation.290 The
rule of construction disfavoring repeals by implication291 applies here—why should a simple change from “the purpose” to
“a significant purpose” be construed to overturn twenty-five
years of FISA understandings that the objective of the procedures is to permit secret gathering of foreign intelligence? The
change from “the” to “a” shows explicit recognition of the overlap between law enforcement and foreign intelligence, and
“significant” qualifies the quantum of foreign intelligence that
285. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 78; 2004 OIG REsupra note 168, at 25.
286. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 78.
287. 2004 OIG REPORT, supra note 168, at 25–26.
288. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 720, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
289. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717
(No. 02-001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/hrng090902
.htm.
290. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1179–81.
291. See Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse
Strings of the Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 855–56 (1994).
PORT,
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must be sought.292 The FISCR decision considerably weakened
the foreign intelligence core of FISA.
When the FISCR convened in 2002, it was undeniable that
national security investigations often have multiple purposes.
Moreover, because Congress has made many terrorist activities
crimes, there is more than ever an overlap between foreign intelligence and law enforcement, even within the same investigation and targets.293 Criminal prosecution supported by effective intelligence investigations can be an effective counterterrorism tactic.294 Still, as interpreted by the Court of Review,
FISA can permit the government to skirt the statutory and
constitutional protections afforded those subject to law enforcement investigations.295 FISA was created as a system for
surveillance for foreign intelligence, not for solving crimes.296
Outside that exceptional arena of foreign intelligence, the Constitution before and after 1978 requires Fourth Amendment notice to targets, Sixth Amendment confrontation of evidence, and
First Amendment freedom of expression without a chill from
the specter of looming FBI surveillance.297
So understood, the wall is an essential part of the larger
context for managing and implementing FISA, whether or not
the pre- or post-Patriot Act language literally requires such
separation.298 If something like the wall procedures are not in
place, FISC-approved surveillance may violate the Constitution
when the FBI begins an investigation principally to build a
criminal case.299

292. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1177–81.
293. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 1, at 9.
294. See id.
295. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 624 (FISA Ct. 2002), abrogated by In re Sealed
Case, F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
296. See Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1320 (2004).
297. See id. at 1339–41 (discussing how the full protections of the American
criminal justice system apply to targets of wiretaps in ordinary law enforcement actions).
298. See RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
SYSTEM IN THE THROES OF REFORM 112–13 (2006) (“[The FBI] incorrectly believes that intelligence is a natural outgrowth of traditional criminal investigative practices.”); id. at 134 (“The Bureau has a history of redefining criminal
investigations as intelligence operations in order to use FISA warrants and
NSA intercepts to obtain information for use in drug or other ordinary-crimes
investigations.”).
299. See Swire, supra note 296, at 1361.
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B. AVOIDANCE OF FISA: THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM
On December 11, 2005, the New York Times publicly revealed what the Bush administration later called the Terrorist
Surveillance Program (TSP), when it reported that President
Bush secretly authorized the National Security Agency (NSA)
to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States
to search for evidence of terrorist activity without judicial approval.300 In a letter from the Justice Department to the congressional intelligence committees a few days later, the Assistant Attorney General stated that a secret order from the
President authorized the program shortly after September 11,
and that the surveillance is aimed at “certain international
communications into and out of the United States of people
linked to al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.”301
Since beginning the program, NSA has monitored the telephone and e-mail communications of thousands of persons inside the United States where one end of the communication is
outside the United States, without warrants.302 Aside from defending the program as “crucial to our national security,”303 the
President lamented “the unauthorized disclosure of this effort
. . . . Revealing classified information is illegal, alerts our enemies, and endangers our country.”304
While the Justice Department launched an investigation of
the leak,305 the administration defended the legality of the TSP
in the face of widespread criticism in Congress, lawsuits by civil
liberties organizations and defendants who have challenged
their previous pleas or convictions, and countless op-ed attacks,
blog debates, and other commentary.306 Many of us wondered—
in light of the win/loss record of the government before the
300. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 23. Although details of the NSA
program remain classified, press reports indicate that data mining and traffic
analysis technologies are being employed. Shane Harris, How Does the NSA
Spy?, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 20, 2006, at 47, 49.
301. Letter from William E. Moschella to Pat Roberts, supra note 24, at 1.
302. Donald L. Doernberg, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Expectations of Privacy, False Friends, and the Perils of Speaking under the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L. REV. 253, 289 (2006).
303. Letter from William E. Moschella to Pat Roberts, supra note 24, at 1.
304. Id.
305. Toni Locy, Justice Dept. Opens Domestic Spying Probe, BREITBART.COM,
Dec. 30, 2005, http://www.breitbart.com/news/2005/12/30/
D8EQLIAGB.html.
306. See infra notes 300–05 and accompanying text.
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FISC, why would the administration not rely on a sure thing?
How could the President have stated in 2004 that “any time
you hear the United States government talking about wiretap,
it requires . . . a court order. Nothing has changed. When we’re
talking about chasing down terrorists, we’re talking about getting a court order before we do so.”307
When critics pointed out the obvious—that secret electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence inside the United
States is provided for by FISA—the administration defended
the decision not to rely on the FISA processes. Given the expansiveness of the definition of “electronic surveillance” in
FISA,308 the “exclusivity” provisions of FISA and the companion
criminal enforcement statute,309 and the criminal penalties for
unauthorized electronic surveillance,310 the administration
faced an uphill legal climb. FISA provides criminal penalties
for anyone who engages in electronic surveillance “not authorized by statute.”311 The administration has argued that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) constitutes
the necessary authorization within the meaning of the FISA
“authorized by statute” provision.312 The text and legislative
history clearly reveal, however, that the purpose of the FISA
provision is to provide security to intelligence personnel who
act in accordance with FISA, not to immunize them if they violate the law.313 The “statute” referred to in section 1809 is
FISA, or Title III.314 Similarly, the administration’s claims of
AUMF authority would make the exclusivity provision in FISA
meaningless.315
Attorney General Gonzales emphasized the need for “speed
and agility” in making judgments about particular intercepts,

307. President’s Remarks in a Discussion on the PATRIOT Act in Buffalo,
New York, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 641 (Apr. 20, 2004).
308. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f ) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
309. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(e)–(f ) (2000 & Supp. II 2003).
310. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. III 2004).
311. Id.
312. Letter from William E. Moschella to Pat Roberts, supra note 24, at 2.
313. See generally NSA III: War Time Executive Power and the FISA Court:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 812 (2006) [hereinafter Statement of David S. Kris] (statement of David S. Kris, Senior Vice
President, Time Warner Inc.), available at http://www.balkin.blogspot.com/
kris.testimony.pdf (discussing how Congress intended for FISA’s procedures to
be the exclusive means for conducting foreign electronic surveillance).
314. Id.
315. Id.
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and he maintained that “navigat[ing] through the FISA process” would delay the work and produce “critical holes in our
early warning system.”316 Acknowledging the emergency authorizations expressly contemplated in FISA, the Attorney
General implied that the required procedures were too burdensome or that, perhaps, they could not be met. Gonzales noted
that he would have to sign off on each application, as would the
lawyers at NSA and Justice Department, after determining
that “all provisions of FISA have been satisfied.”317 Although
Gonzales did not clearly state whether it was the anticipated
failure to meet the probable cause requirement of FISA or the
burden of work to meet the seventy-two-hour deadline that led
the administration to go outside FISA, Deputy Director of National Intelligence, General Michael V. Hayden stated at about
the same time that the administration had unilaterally adopted
a “reasonable suspicion” standard in applying the TSP because
the “probable cause” standard in FISA is, in the words of one
commentator, “too onerous.”318
The administration passed up an invitation to revise the
predicate probable cause standard in 2002. Legislation proposed by Senator Michael DeWine would have substituted a
“reasonable suspicion” standard for “probable cause” to believe
that the surveillance target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power for FISA surveillance requests involving non-United
States persons.319 When asked to advise Congress on the proposed amendment, James A. Baker, then head of OIPR in the
Justice Department, gatekeeper of the FISA process, opined
that the Patriot Act extension of the emergency surveillance
window from twenty-four to seventy-two hours “has allowed us
to make full and effective use of FISA’s pre-existing emergency
provisions to ensure that the government acts swiftly to re-

316. Alberto R. Gonzales, Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks for Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the Georgetown University Law Center (Jan. 24,
2006) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_0601241
.html [hereinafter Gonzales, Georgetown Remarks].
317. Id.
318. Unclaimed Territory, The Administration’s New FISA Defense is Factually False, http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006/02/adminstrations-new
-fisa-defense-is.html (Jan. 24, 2006, 16:11 EST) [hereinafter Unclaimed Territory].
319. Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing on
S. 2586 and S. 2659 Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 12
(2002) (statement of Sen. Michael DeWine), available at http://intelligence
.senate.gov/fisa.pdf.
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spond to terrorist threats.”320 Baker testified that the Justice
Department would not support Senator DeWine’s proposal—
because the probable cause standard was likely not an obstacle
to effective use of FISA, and because the Department worried
that the reasonable suspicion standard might be unconstitutional.321 The executive branch thus expressed concern that a
lowered standard might be unconstitutional at the same time
they were engaged in just that practice. Admittedly, the
DeWine proposal would have loosened the predicate only for
non-United States persons. The TSP does not distinguish
United States persons from others, and it forgoes the FISC
oversight that the lower standard would continue to provide.
Attorney General Gonzales also asserted that seeking legislative authority for the TSP would have tipped off the enemies and let them know what surveillance activities we were
pursuing.322 Although Gonzales stated that the administration
had been “advised that [it] would be difficult, if not impossible”323 to obtain such an amendment to FISA, he apparently referred not to the political or legal difficulties such a proposal
would face, but to the concern that such an amendment could
not be obtained “without jeopardizing the existence of the program.”324 For example, once the administration admitted the
program’s existence and cautioned that the program only intercepted international calls, in theory those who subject to the
surveillance could evade the program through countermeasures, such as use of VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) phones
with U.S. numbers but used abroad.325
Putting to one side the possibility of legislation being considered in executive session, with classified information secured and sources and methods protected pursuant to House
and Senate rules, and despite some briefings on the TSP to se320. Id. at 23 (statement of James A. Baker, Counsel for Intelligence Policy, Dep’t of Justice).
321. Id.
322. Press Briefing, Alberto R. Gonzales, Att’y Gen., Gen. Michael V. Hayden, Principal Deputy Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html [hereinafter Press Briefing, Gonzales & Hayden].
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. VoIP telephone technology permits the user to mask his location because the phone number where the call originates may be a U.S. number from
wherever the call is placed. See FCC, Voice over Internet Protocol Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.fcc.gov/voip/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
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lected members, Congress did not know what NSA was doing in
the TSP. By statute the President is required to keep the congressional intelligence committees “fully and currently informed” of the intelligence activities of the United States, including any “significant anticipated intelligence activity.”326 For
covert actions, the President is permitted, in order “to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the
United States” to limit reporting to select members of the Congressional intelligence committees and the leaders of the House
and the Senate—“Gang of Eight.”327 Reportedly, the TSP was
briefed only to the Gang of Eight, and the eight were forbidden
from sharing information about the program with colleagues,
including members of the intelligence committees.328 However,
as described by the administration, the TSP is an intelligence
collection program, not a covert action program. As defined by
statute, covert action does not include those “activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence.”329 As such,
the TSP had to be disclosed to the intelligence committees.
The only plausible legal cover for the truncated notice and
briefing to Congress is that the reporting requirements for intelligence collection activities are binding “[t]o the extent consistent with due regard for the protection of unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive
intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters.”330 If that is the explanation, however, some form
of limited notice would be justified only for the particularly
sensitive aspects of the program, not the fact of its existence.
The administration claims that the TSP was regularly vetted by lawyers at the Department of Justice.331 Newsweek
magazine reported, however, that dissension over the TSP inside the Department spilled over when then Deputy Attorney
General James Comey refused to authorize the NSA program
during a period when Attorney General Ashcroft was in the
hospital with a serious medical condition.332 When Comey re326. 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. III 2004).
327. Id. § 413b(c)(2).
328. Press Release, Sen. John D. (Jay) Rockefeller, IV, Vice Chairman
Rockefeller Reacts to Reports of NSA Intercept Program in United States (Dec.
19, 2005), available at http://www.senate.gov/~rockefeller/news/2005/
pr121905a.html.
329. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e).
330. Id. § 413a(a).
331. See Press Briefing, Gonzales & Hayden, supra note 322.
332. Daniel Klaidman et al., Palace Revolt: They Were Loyal Conservatives,
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fused to sign off on the program, a White House delegation, including then White House Counsel Gonzales, visited Ashcroft
in the hospital to appeal Comey’s decision, with apparent success.333 Vetted or not, administration admissions that wholly
domestic calls might have been monitored in the larger sweep
for terrorist activities contradict the claim that the only calls to
or from persons and locations overseas are monitored.334
Those who characterize the TSP as a complex and technologically advanced data mining program that simply cannot be
fitted inside the obsolete structure of FISA take a different
path.335 Apart from the Attorney General and the President falling back on the need for “speed and agility,” and stating that
the war we are fighting is “a different war,” many advocates of
the TSP say, quite simply, that the law has failed to keep up
with the technology.336 However, according to General Hayden,
who was head of NSA when the program was implemented,
TSP “is not a driftnet over Dearborn or Lackawanna or Freemont, grabbing conversations that we then sort out by these alleged keyword searches or data-mining tools. . . . This is targeted and focused.”337 Hayden claimed the surveillance was
limited to “international calls and only those we have a reasonable basis to believe involve al Qaeda or one of its affiliates.”338
Hayden was blunt: “we’re not there sucking up coms and then
using some of these magically alleged keyword searches—Did
he say ‘jihad’?”339 Instead, a shift supervisor at NSA substitutes
for a federal judge.340 She decides what part of the product of
the data-mining merits further targeted surveillance, and the

and Bush Appointees. They Fought a Quiet battle to Rein in the President’s
Power in the War on Terror. And They Paid a Price for It. A Newsweek Investigation, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 2006, at 34, 39.
333. Id.
334. See Stewart M. Powell, White House Acknowledges Some Taps Wholly
Domestic, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 22, 2005, at A6.
335. Press Briefing, Gonzales & Hayden, supra note 322.
336. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Op-Ed., A New Surveillance Act, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at A16; K.A. Taipale & James Jay Carafano, Op-Ed., Fixing Surveillance, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, available at http://www
.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20060124-104527.
337. General M. Powell, Principal Deputy Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Address to the National Press Club (Jan. 23, 2006), available at http://www.fas
.org/irp/news/2006/01/hayden012306.html.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
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standard she employs in making those decisions is reasonable
suspicion instead of probable cause.341
The legality of the TSP was thus defended by the Administration at the same time that it admitted, in effect, that the
program does not comply with FISA. Nor did the Administration fulfill congressional reporting requirements for intelligence
collection activities. Whether officials substituted a “reasonable
suspicion” standard or some other criterion in deciding who to
target with TSP, the substitution of an NSA employee for a
federal judge as the gatekeeper is a startling departure from
the regularized procedures of FISA.
C. SYNTHESIZING THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 DEVELOPMENTS:
THE DEATH OF FISA
The inter-branch compromise that produced FISA contains
a series of interlocking elements. FISA required a form of prior
judicial approval to intercept electronic communications inside
the United States, except in emergencies.342 The interception
had to be targeted at particular persons or places related to
suspected terrorism or espionage.343 The predicate for issuing a
court order was a showing of probable cause of foreign agency
and that foreign intelligence will be acquired,344 and Congress
determined in 1978 that these parameters were the exclusive
means for carrying our electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence inside the United States.345 A fully informed Congress
was to oversee all of the above.346
Part B showed that amendments to the Act, judicial decisions, or executive practice have already undercut some of
these elements of FISA. Others remained arguably intact until
the TSP emerged, and Congress prepared to bargain away the
important remaining pieces of FISA. The two sea-change developments explored here—dismantling of the foreign intelligence
“purpose” screening requirements and the NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program—should not be understood as the only
causes of the death of FISA. Larger institutional and societal

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

Id.
50 U.S.C. § 1805(f ) (2000).
Id. § 1805(a)(3).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f ) (2000 & Supp. III 2004).
50 U.S.C. §§ 413(a)(1), 1807–1808 (2000).

BANKS_4FMT

2007]

6/1/2007 11:21:03 AM

THE DEATH OF FISA

1261

atmospherics, particularly in the last five years, place the demise of FISA in context.
An overriding aura of emergency has driven the postSeptember 11 counter-terrorism programs, including the
Patriot Act,347 the FISCR decision,348 and the NSA program.349
The Bush administration effectively has sustained the emergency through its global war on terrorism and the war in Iraq,
and Congress and the courts have altered their perspectives in
light of it.350 One result is that the central lesson of the Keith
case has been lost—that the societal interests in security and
civil liberties must be balanced, with the participation of the
federal courts.351 In a 2006 insider’s account by Professor John
Yoo of his experiences inside the Justice Department in helping
to shape the post-September 11 programs, Yoo maintained that
“FISA . . . was created specifically to hamstring the executive
branch in favor of civil liberties.”352 Professor Yoo’s revisionist
history is emblematic of the change in orientation of government after September 11, a change also expressed in the opinion of the FISA Court of Review. In rejecting the opinion signed
by all of the FISC judges, the Court of Review essentially took
the core out of FISA when it opined that the Justice Department would have free rein in deciding when to use the FISA
procedures.353
During the same period, Congress effectively ceded its role
in leadership.354 The executive branch devised the policies it
wished to follow after September 11, and it set in place the programs and enforcement activities to meet the policy objectives.

347. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2000).
348. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 720, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
349. See Harris, supra note 300, at 47.
350. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 23, at A16 (discussing how the NSA
program reflects a major shift in American intelligence gather practices).
351. See id. at A1 (discussing the difficulty of identifying a line between
national security interests and the rights of Americans against undue
searches).
352. YOO, supra note 206, at 73.
353. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 731–32.
354. See Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann, When Congress Checks
Out, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 67, 68 (“In the past six years,
Congressional oversight of the executive . . . on foreign and national security
policy . . . has virtually collapsed.”).
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1. The Wall
In early oversight hearings on the implementation of FISA,
Senator Malcolm Wallop expressed the view that the “net effect
[of FISA] has been to confuse intelligence gathering with
criminal law” and that it is “nonsense” to attempt a formula for
comprehensive surveillance of those who constitute a security
threat.355 Nonetheless, the FISA process worked reasonably
well. Evidence impermissibly gathered through FISA surveillance did not taint affected criminal prosecutions because the
“primary purpose” rule was workable in practice. At the same
time, direction and control from the law enforcement side of the
Justice Department did not encumber the foreign intelligence
investigators.
Within days of September 11, FISA became a convenient
foil for those seeking to explain our government’s failure to stop
the hijackers. It became part of the urban myth surrounding
September 11 that the FISA wall caused the government to
lose contact with suspected terrorists,356 and most notoriously,
that the FISA wall was blamed for the failure to secure FISA
surveillance of then supposed twentieth hijacker Zacarias
Moussaoui’s laptop computer in the days and weeks before September 11.357 Moussaoui was arrested on an immigration overstay charge in August 2001. A flight instructor at a flight training school in Minnesota grew suspicious when Moussaoui said
that he wanted to learn to fly large jet aircraft, but that he had
no interest in becoming a commercial pilot.358
355. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, S. REP. NO. 97-691, at 9–
10 (1982).
356. See YOO, supra note 206, at 72 (“I was asked to work on fixing the
most important defect in our intelligence laws—the legal ‘Wall’ . . . . the Wall
had played a role in our failure to stop the 9/11 attacks.”).
357. See JOINT INQUIRY STAFF, 107TH CONG., THE FBI’S HANDLING OF THE
PHOENIX ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION AND INVESTIGATION OF ZACARIAS
MOUSSAOUI PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, at 14 (2d Sess. 2002) (statement of
Eleanor Hill, Staff Dir., Joint Inquiry Staff ) [hereinafter JOINT INQUIRY STAFF
MEMORANDUM],
available
at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/
092402hill_pdf.
358. Press Release, Pan Am Int’l Flight Acad., Pan Am International Flight
Academy Statement to the News Media, http://www.panamacademy.com/
template_press.asp?id=119 (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). The Minneapolis Star
Tribune quoted the flight instructor as telling the FBI, “Do you realize how
serious this is? . . . This man wants training on a 747. A 747 fully loaded with
fuel could be used as a weapon!” Greg Gordon, A Persistent Suspicion: Eagan
Flight Trainer Wouldn’t Let Unease About Suspect Rest, STAR TRIB., Dec. 21,
2001, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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When field agents sought the headquarters’ approval for a
FISA surveillance order, they were turned down, because there
was insufficient information connecting Moussaoui to a foreign
power.359 However, the headquarters’ agents only orally briefed
the lawyers responsible for making the foreign agency recommendation. If the agents had searched FBI computer records
relevant to the Moussaoui request, they would have had access
to a July 2001 memorandum from a Phoenix agent that warned
about the potential dangers of al Qaeda affiliates seeking training at U.S. flight schools.360 FBI personnel did not follow up on
the memorandum, and no senior officials at the Bureau saw the
memorandum before September 11.361 In addition, the headquarters’ staff lawyers apparently mistakenly advised the Minneapolis agents that foreign agency required a link to a terrorist organization on the State Department list of terrorist
organizations.362 At about the same time, the FBI received a
classified cable from a French intelligence agency that warned
the Moussaoui had “Islamic extremist beliefs.”363 If the French
intelligence had been coupled with the Phoenix memorandum,
the fact-sensitive foreign agency inquiry might have produced a
different outcome. But the two sources together would have
only suggested that Moussaoui was affiliated with al Qaeda
and thus had a connection to a foreign power.364
The Minnesota agents did not open a criminal investigation that would have permitted a search of Moussaoui’s laptop
because FBI headquarters believed that the agents lacked sufficient probable cause of a crime.365 A criminal case was opened
and a FISA order was obtained, but only after the September
359. JOINT INQUIRY STAFF MEMORANDUM, supra note 357, at 17.
360. See Shelby, supra note 15, at 29.
361. Id. at 29–30.
362. Id. at 53.
363. David Johnston & Philip Shenon, F.B.I. Curbed Scrutiny of Man Now
a Suspect in the Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2001, at A1. Professor Yoo
slightly alters the reported facts regarding Moussaoui and writes that Moussaoui “had connections to extreme Islamic groups.” YOO, supra note 206, at 80.
It was precisely the lack of demonstrated ties to any foreign power that caused
headquarters to decline to pursue a FISA application. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 274.
364. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 272. On September 13,
the British government received and passed on to the United States intelligence that Moussaoui had attended an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. Id. Obviously, if this information had been available in August, the
predicate for FISA surveillance would have existed. Id. at 275.
365. Id. at 273–74.
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11 attacks.366 Although the 9/11 Commission later found that a
“maximum U.S. effort” to investigate Moussaoui “might have
brought investigators to the core of the 9/11 plot,” the Commission refused to blame any shortcomings in investigating Moussaoui on the “purpose” requirement or the wall procedures implementing FISA.367 Nonetheless, the Moussaoui story emerged
as a symbol of the supposed dysfunctional state of intelligence
sharing in Washington and it became part of the urban myth
that helped spur enactment of the Patriot Act.368
Professor John Yoo helped reinforce the mythical stature of
the wall. He blamed “[s]trict enforcement of the Wall between
law enforcement and foreign intelligence” for preventing the
CIA from sharing photos with the FBI showing a meeting between eventual hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar and al Qaeda operatives involved in the bombing of the USS Cole.369 According
to Professor Yoo, because the Cole bombing investigation was
run by the FBI Criminal Division, the CIA refused to share its
intelligence photos “because of the Wall.”370 When Mihdhar entered the U.S. again on July 4, 2001, CIA and FBI counterterror agents knew of his al Qaeda connection and tried to locate him, but they refused to share their information with the
FBI criminal agents in New York.371 The FBI criminal agent
working on the Cole investigation replied angrily in an e-mail
message that “whatever has happened to this—someday someone will die—and wall or not—the public will not understand
why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we
had at certain ‘problems.’”372
The FBI agent’s frustration is palpable and understandable, but Professor Yoo’s attribution of blame to FISA or any
legal procedures implementing FISA is misplaced. After hearing testimony from the relevant officials, including Attorney
General Ashcroft,373 the 9/11 Commission concluded that in the
366. Id. at 276.
367. Id. (stating that the connection between Moussaoui and al Qaeda was
“not an easy trail to find”).
368. See generally Craig S. Lerner, Calling a Truce in the Culture Wars:
From Enron to the CIA, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 277, 277–78 (2006) (discussing the public’s view of the intelligence failure).
369. YOO, supra note 206, at 80.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 80–81.
372. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 271.
373. Id. at 439 (listing the witnesses who testified in front of the Commission).
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Mihdhar case “everyone involved was confused about the rules
governing the sharing and use of information gathered in intelligence channels.”374 A criminal investigation had already been
opened on the Cole bombing, and Mihdhar could have been investigated and tracked as part of that case.375 Unfortunately,
either the FBI intelligence agent that possessed information
about Mihdhar or a Bureau lawyer who advised her incorrectly
determined that the intelligence could not be shared with the
criminal investigators.
The FISA wall procedures were designed to protect against
using the secretive foreign intelligence collection process in order to build a criminal case.376 FISA never stood in the way of
the sharing of criminal information with intelligence investigators.377 Nor did it apply to the sharing of intelligence information with criminal investigators, so long as the sharing met the
foreign intelligence purpose rule.378
The 1995 procedures governed sharing with prosecutors,
not other FBI agents.379 Ironically, the intelligence concerning
Mihdhar came from NSA and was ordered by Attorney General
Reno, pursuant to Executive Order 12,333.380 In what the 9/11
Commission called an “overabundance of caution. . . [d]uring
the millennium crisis,”381 the Attorney General ordered overseas electronic surveillance of three U.S. persons with the proviso that the results not be shared with criminal investigators
or prosecutors without the permission of OIPR.382 Even though
the restrictions did not apply to the Mihdhar surveillance, NSA
placed the restrictions on all of the agency’s bin Laden-related
reporting.383 Attorney General Ashcroft testified before the 9/11
Commission that these information sharing problems were attributable to the 1995 guidelines.384 The Commission disagreed
and found that, “[w]hatever the merits of the . . . 1995 . . . procedures . . . , they did not apply to the information the analyst

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. at 271.
Id.
Banks, supra note 16, at 1152–53.
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 538 n.80.
Id.
2004 OIG REPORT, supra note 168, at 27.
Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,951 (Dec. 4, 1981).
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 537, n.71.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 539 n.83.
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decided she could not share with the criminal agent.”385 In
short, “a bureaucratic culture,” not legal restrictions, prevented
the sharing of intelligence that might have led investigators to
at least one of the September 11 hijackers before the attacks.386
Once the Patriot Act was implemented, the supposed gains
in counter-terrorism prosecutions that came from lowering the
wall were showcased in the February 2003 indictment of Sami
Al-Arian and others in Florida, based on allegations that they
financed suicide bombings in Israel.387 Attorney General
Ashcroft maintained at the news conference that the investigators had been “stymied” by restrictions on the use of foreign intelligence in criminal cases and that the expanded powers
granted by the Patriot Act allowed them to proceed with the
prosecution.388 In fact, the FBI began investigating Al-Arian in
the early 1990s and began FISA-approved electronic surveillance in the same period.389 Some of the material that prosecutors used to bring their indictment was ten years old, and it
included much that is foreign intelligence as defined in FISA.390
It was false to imply that the pre-Patriot Act FISA inhibited
building a criminal case against Al-Arian and his coconspirators.391 So long as the investigators sought the FISA
surveillance for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence,
the Department did not run afoul of FISA and it was not hamstrung by FISA in bringing its criminal prosecution.392
As the Patriot Act sunsets loomed in 2005 and then were
extended by temporary legislation into early 2006,393 serious
consideration was never given to revisiting the “significant
385. Id.
386. Id. (“Simply put, there was no legal reason why the information the
analyst possessed could not have been shared with the criminal agent.”).
387. Eric Lichtblau & Judith Miller, Indictment Ties U.S. Professor to Terror Group, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2003, at A1.
388. See Banks supra note 16, at 1188; John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen.,
Press Conference (Feb. 20, 2003) (transcript available at http://
transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0302/20/se.04.html).
389. Banks, supra note 16, at 1188.
390. Id.; see also 50 U.S.C. 1801(e) (2000) (defining foreign intelligence).
391. Banks, supra note 16, at 1188–89.
392. Id. at 1189.
393. Emergency legislation first extended the sunset provisions until February 3, 2006. Extension of the Sunset of Certain Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 109-160 § 1, 119 Stat. 2957 (2005). A second act extended the provisions until March 10, 2006. Extension of Sunset of Certain
Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 109-170 § 1, 120 Stat. 3
(2006).
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purpose” language or to clarifying the reason for the “purpose”
language. Instead, after compromises were made to revise the
authorities for National Security Letters and business records,394 the sunset on the significant purpose provision and
twelve of fourteen other Patriot Act authorities subject to sunset were simply repealed.395
The reauthorization and lifting of the sunset on “significant purpose” only underscores that the Patriot Act change was
not legally necessary or sufficient to eliminate the wall. The
amendment was not necessary because the obstacles to sharing
information or integrating data are not the product of legal
rules.396 A change would not have been sufficient to overcome
the Fourth Amendment requirement that relaxed approval
processes for electronic surveillance be reserved for when the
purpose is collection of foreign intelligence.397
The Supreme Court has never upheld warrantless electronic surveillance inside the United States.398 If criminal
prosecutors were permitted to initiate, direct, and control warrantless electronic surveillance and then use the information so
collected as prosecution evidence, they would be circumventing
the traditional Fourth Amendment requirements by using alternate procedures allowed specifically for foreign intelligence
to develop a criminal prosecution.399 However, the Supreme
394. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., USA PATRIOT ACT: BACKGROUND AND COMPARISON OF HOUSE- AND SENATE-APPROVED REAUTHORIZATION AND RELATED LEGISLATIVE ACTION 12–13 (2005) (listing the differences

between the House and Senate resolutions).
395. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-177 § 102(a), 120 Stat. 192, 195 (2006). A new sunset of December
31, 2009 was approved for surveillance of suspected “lone wolf ” terrorists. Id.
§ 103.
396. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 539 n.83 (stating that
there was “no legal reason” why information could not be shared).
397. Compare United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321
(1972) (rejecting warrantless wiretapping of a domestic group engaged in national security crimes), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358–59 (1967)
(no exception to the traditional warrant requirement for electronic surveillance), and Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72
GEO. WASH L. REV. 1264, 1299–1304 (2004) (arguing for a return to the prePatriot Act “primary purpose” standard for FISA surveillance), with AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 31 (1997) (claiming that the Fourth Amendment requires reasonableness, not probable cause
and a warrant).
398. See, e.g., Keith, 407 U.S. at 321.
399. Id. at 316–17 (“[Unreviewed discretion] may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech.”).
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Court’s recognized in the Keith decision that traditional Fourth
Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements may not
be compatible with the needs of national security surveillance
and that different standards might be constitutionally permissible if they are reasonable.400 FISA incorporated these concerns and reflects Congress’s recognition of the real world difficulties of separating the foreign intelligence and law
enforcement components of an investigation concerning international terrorism. Although the prosecution does not actually
initiate and direct a FISA investigation, the significant purpose
amendment to FISA does allow prosecutors access to FISAderived evidence in the criminal case.401
Nor did FISA, before or after the Patriot Act, prevent the
government from using FISA-authorized surveillance against a
defendant in a criminal case.402 In fact, evidence obtained
through FISA surveillance has often been used in criminal
prosecutions.403 In a number of cases discussed in this Article,
convicted terrorists have appealed in part on grounds that incriminating evidence obtained through FISC-approved surveillance should not have been admitted because it was acquired in
order to build the criminal cases, and the criminal warrant
process was not followed.404 The courts of appeals have consistently rejected these arguments.405 The Sarkissian court refused “to draw too fine a distinction between criminal and intelligence investigations,” and it noted that the investigation of
international terrorism necessarily requires investigation of
criminal activities.406 So long as the purpose of launching the
FISA surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence, the fact that
the government later chooses to prosecute the target does not
undercut the lawfulness of the FISA surveillance.

400. See id. at 322–23.
401. See Swire, supra note 296, at 1330–31 (noting that the amendment
was promulgated to allow information sharing between criminal and foreign
intelligence investigations).
402. Banks, supra note 16, at 1189.
403. See, e.g., United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004) (en
banc), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005); United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d
959 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
404. See, e.g., Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 332; Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 961;
Duggan, 743 F.2d at 64–65.
405. Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 333–34; Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 964–65;
Duggan, 743 F.2d at 78.
406. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 965.
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To argue, as some did in the Patriot Act reauthorization
debates, that the modern blending of crimes and foreign intelligence threats should be reason enough to eliminate the wall
provisions.407 However, this fails to take into account that the
purpose requirement focuses on the investigators’ reason for
seeking a FISA order, not on what is done with the product of
the surveillance.408 If the purpose of the investigation is to
prosecute, FISA should be unavailable, given its requirements
and protections of the Fourth, Sixth, and First Amendments.409
If the purpose is to monitor conversations toward understanding a terrorist threat, FISA may be used if its requirements are
otherwise met. If both objectives are present, responsible officials should weigh which purpose is dominant and use the appropriate path toward authorized surveillance. The 2001
amendment and its 2006 codification did not tear down the
wall; nor did the 1978 purpose language build it. Nor could
these phrases in FISA knock down a set of protections that the
Constitution requires.
Within a few months of the FISCR decision,410 the Justice
Department reported to the House Judiciary Committee that
the procedures approved by the FISCR greatly improved the
way that investigations are conducted, in terms of efficiency,
order, and effectiveness.411 Approximately 4500 open intelligence files were shared with criminal prosecutors during that
several month period.412 In 2003, the FBI issued a directive, the
Model Counterterrorism Investigations Strategy (MCIS), which
requires law enforcement and intelligence investigators to work
together as part of the same teams investigating terrorism.413
407. Kate Martin & Viet Dinh, Section 203: Authority to Share Criminal
Investigative Information, in PATRIOT DEBATES: EXPERTS DEBATE THE USA
PATRIOT ACT 12 (Stewart A. Baker & John Kavanagh eds., 2005) (“Even the
most strident opponents of the USA PATRIOT ACT would not want another
terrorist attack to occur because law enforcement and intelligence communities were prevented from talking to each other.”). This rhetoric obscures the
fact that FISA did not prevent such sharing of information. In re Sealed Case,
310 F.3d 717, 727 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
408. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1158 (discussing the focus of the primary
purpose provision).
409. See Swire, supra note 296, at 1361.
410. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717.
411. Letter from Jamie E. Brown, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., Chairman, House Comm. Judiciary
15–16 (May 13, 2003).
412. Id. at 16.
413. See Dan Eggen, FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance, WASH. POST,
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All terrorism investigations are “handled from the outset like
an intelligence or espionage investigation,” run out of the
counter-terrorism division at the FBI, and investigators from
the blended teams may use FISA processes.414 One aim of the
new system is to deemphasize criminal prosecution in favor of
longer term surveillance, although prosecutors that bring
criminal charges will be able to use FISA surveillance at
trial.415
In September 2005 testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, a senior FBI official stated that the Patriot Act, the
Ashcroft information sharing procedures, and the FISCR decision “removed real and perceived barriers to coordination”
among the FBI and other intelligence agencies.416 In a September 2006 release the Justice Department reported an increase
of more than 122 percent in court-approved FISA applications
between 2001 and 2005, with anticipated 10 percent growth for
2006.417 In addition, since 2004 the Department had reduced
the backlog of pending FISA requests by about 60 percent, and
reduced the number of days it takes to process FISA requests
by 35 percent.418 The size of the lawyer staff at OIPR was tripled during the same period, and standardized pleadings and
automated drafting have made FISA filings shorter and easier
to produce.419
Former NSA General Counsel Stewart Baker maintained
that the wall was born out of fear.420 Baker believed that
agency professionals “were focused on the hypothetical risk to
privacy if foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement
were allowed to mix” and on the chance “that years of successful collaboration would end in disaster if the results of a single
collaboration could be painted as a privacy scandal.”421 Whatever the motivation, Baker is surely correct that the wall was
deeply embedded in the FISA culture when these decisions
Dec. 13, 2003, at A1.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 35 (2005) (statement of Gary M. Bald,
Executive Assistant Dir., Nat’l Sec. Branch, FBI).
417. DOJ, FACT SHEET, supra note 6.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Stewart Baker, Wall Nuts, SLATE, Dec. 31, 2003, http://www.slate
.com/id/2093344/.
421. Id.
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were rendered in 2002.422 The FISC did not see the risk identified by Baker as hypothetical, and it had long experience in
managing the FISA process.423 The FISCR appeared to side
with Baker, but it had never seen a FISA application before.424
If the FISCR decision is forming the basis for implementing
FISA now, the FBI is permitted to obtain FISC permission to
conduct a secret electronic surveillance or search for the primary purpose of investigating a crime even though there is no
probable cause to suspect the commission of a crime.
2. Statutory Obsolescence and Lone Wolf
One by-product of the compromising that was necessary to
produce FISA was a set of definitions and procedures that were
difficult to understand and apply, even in the beginning.425 As
sometimes happens with major legislation that is complicated
at the outset, amendments are made and, over time, what was
complex becomes hopelessly complex.
In addition, the investigative resources directed at countering terrorism have grown considerably, and their orientation
has shifted. In the years since FISA was implemented, Congress has, often at the behest of the executive branch, criminalized more and more national security and terrorism-related
conduct, adding hundreds of new offenses to the federal criminal code.426 As a result, in the universe of foreign intelligence
surveillance, a law enforcement purpose for the surveillance inevitably occupies a larger portion of the whole than it once did.
The challenges in sorting out what should be FISA surveillance
and what should follow the law enforcement model are greater
now than they were in 1978.
As terrorism overtook espionage as the dominant foreign
intelligence collection challenge, the foreign power and agent of
a foreign power concepts did not align easily with targeting objectives.427 The growing criminalization of terrorism made the

422. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 727 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
423. Banks, supra note 16, at 1167–71.
424. See id. at 1171–74.
425. See Banks, supra note 16, at 1161–62 (describing early difficulties of
overlapping procedures); Swire, supra note 296, at 1325 (calling FISA a “grand
compromise”).
426. See NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
5–7 (1st ed. 2005) (listing the major legislative programs).
427. See Solove, supra note 397, at 1289 (noting that FISA was created for
gathering intelligence about foreign powers inside the United States).
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minimization rubric for what was collected pursuant to FISA
harder to sustain, while the growing need for cooperation and
information sharing was not contemplated when FISA was enacted in 1978. Congress never took the initiative, nor did the
executive branch, to step back and rewrite FISA from top to
bottom. As a result, the issues that have plagued FISA have
lingered, and new ones crop up. Amendments have been made
piecemeal.
When Congress amended FISA in 2004 to provide authority to conduct FISA-ordered investigations of so-called “lone
wolf” terrorist suspects,428 it was billed by many as “the Moussaoui fix”—referring to the failure to find that Moussaoui was
an agent of a foreign power as defined by FISA because he had
no apparent links to terrorist organizations.429 As amended, the
“[a]gent of a foreign power” may include any person, other than
a United States person, who . . . “engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore.”430 In expanding
FISA to reach these unaffiliated persons, or those for whom the
foreign agency connection cannot be established by probable
cause, Congress did not attempt to revisit its 1978 formula for
identifying targets, an approach that was derived from traditional concerns with espionage and counterintelligence.431 Logically, the foreign agency concept could not bear the weight of
the lone wolf amendment in 2004. If an individual may be targeted for FISA surveillance without any showing of a connection to any other supposed terrorists, the idea of “agency” simply does not fit. Congress can call an unaffiliated person an
agent, but the Act does not require any agency relationship.
Yet the lone wolf amendment is arguably among the most
defensible changes to FISA since 1978. On the one hand, recent
terrorist trends suggest that the lone wolf is the terrorist of our
time, symbolized by the universal violent jihad rhetoric.432 In428. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(1)(C) (West 2006).
429. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 274.
430. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(1)(C). Like several other Patriot Act provisions,
the lone wolf authority was set to expire at the end of 2005, but in March 2006
Congress extended the sunset date for the lone wolf provision to December 31,
2009. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-177, § 103, 120 Stat. 192, 195 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A § 1801
(West 2006)).
431. See Solove, supra note 397, at 1289 (noting that FISA was created to
combat espionage).
432. See, e.g., Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir., FBI, Remarks at the City Club of
Cleveland (June 23, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.fbi
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dividual terrorists are not a new phenomenon, and examples of
the lone wolf trace back at least as far as European anarchists
in the late nineteenth century.433 As Bob Chesney has explained, internet and encryption technologies have joined with
the growing violent jihad movement and the partial success of
efforts to curtail violent jihad organizations to facilitate the
growth of unaffiliated terrorists and their causes.434 Conducting surveillance only of those who are foreign agents may miss
some of the most important targets.
On the other hand, the extension of FISA processes to unaffiliated individuals does not solve the problem of coming up
with sufficient information to meet the FISA probable cause
requirement.435 Put differently, investigators still have to know
something about the lone wolf target before they may begin
FISA surveillance, and learning that modicum of information is
made no easier by the lone wolf amendment.
At first blush, the lone wolf provision may appear to permit
intrusive electronic surveillance pursuant to FISA of an especially broad array of individuals436—from those who are suspected of buying or selling component materials for weapons of
mass destruction to those who make donations to apparently
humanitarian organizations in the Middle East.437 However,
the lone wolf provision does not apply to U.S. persons438 and it
requires pursuit of “foreign intelligence” and a connection to
“international terrorism,” offering protection against targeting

.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller062306.htm) (“Today, terrorist threats may
come from smaller, more loosely-defined individuals and cells . . . who are inspired by a violent jihadist message. These homegrown terrorists may prove to
be as dangerous as groups like al Qaeda, if not more so.”).
433. PAUL WILKINSON, TERRORISM AND THE LIBERAL STATE 97–99 (2d ed.
1986).
434. Chesney, supra note 66, at 439–40, 445.
435. Kim Taiple, Whispering Wires and the Warrantless Wiretaps: Data
Mining and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, BULL. ON L. & SEC. (Ctr. on Law
& Sec., New York, N.Y.), Spring 2006, at 4, 4, 8 n.7.
436. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(1)(C) (West 2006) (including “any person”
engaging in terrorist activities).
437. See id. § 1801(c) (defining international terrorism activities).
438. Id. If it is illogical to call a lone wolf an agent of a foreign power, so too
does it not make logical sense to exclude U.S. persons from eligibility for lone
wolf status under FISA. Homegrown terrorism exists, and that terrorism can
spring from domestic as easily as foreign sources. Once foreign agency is
eliminated as a real requirement for FISA targeting, the logic of excluding
U.S. persons evaporates. Our constitutional system may not permit extending
FISA status to domestic lone wolves, but this is a topic for another article.
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domestic activities.439 Yet in the post-September 11 era, where
supposed links to al Qaeda are legion, the tendency to rely on
FISA to investigate even the most speculative suspicions of a
connection to international terrorism by lone wolves could turn
FISA surveillance into a quotidian occurrence.
Moreover, there may be a tendency to couple the discretion
to conduct electronic surveillance of lone wolves with early arrest and prosecution. If so, cessation of surveillance may impose opportunity costs and a higher likelihood of acquittals
than have been the case under the previous foreign agency criteria.440 With this potential risk in mind, the lone wolf change
may be a practical statutory salve to an important policy challenge, while it shows that the original FISA framework for targeting electronic surveillance may not be workable now.
IV. THE FUTURE PROSPECTS
Now that the basic survival of FISA has been called into
question, it is important to consider whether FISA can be restored to its useful role in maintaining the security and civil
liberties balance. Changes in technology and the dimensions of
the modern threat of international terrorism have combined to
complicate finding the appropriate mechanisms that may or
may not be accommodated inside the FISA scheme. This part of
the Article will consider whether technological developments
make it impossible for the TSP to be conducted with FISA procedures. Next, the Article will offer some tentative conclusions
concerning the lawfulness of the TSP. Then it will evaluate
proposed FISA amendments, although in the main they simply
relegate FISA to an historic dust bin. Whether the TSP could
be reshaped harmoniously with a still-relevant FISA is a hard
question, one that I will address briefly in the final two subsections.
A. FISA AND MODERN TECHNOLOGY
When deliberating FISA in 1977, Congress was well aware
that NSA had engaged in its share of the abuses chronicled by
the Church Committee and others.441 From 1945 until 1975,
NSA received copies of millions of international telegrams sent
439. Id. §§ 1801(b)–(c).
440. Chesney, supra note 66, at 427.
441. S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 34 n.39 (1977), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3936 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-774, pt. 3, at 733 (1976)).
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to, through, or from the United States.442 NSA intended Operation SHAMROCK to obtain telegrams of foreign targets for foreign intelligence purposes.443 With the assistance of commercial
telegraph companies and without obtaining any kind of judicial
warrant, NSA had access to as many as 150,000 telegrams per
month, including those of U.S. citizens who were not in any
way targeted for foreign intelligence and who reasonably expected their communications to be private.444 When considering
FISA, however, Congress expressly declined to extend FISA
procedures to NSA surveillance activities at least in part because of then-recent enhancements in oversight of NSA provided by presidential executive orders and through classified
Attorney General procedures.445 In addition, Congress took
note of the “particularly difficult conceptual and technical problems” in regulating NSA, and it opted to leave NSA untouched
until separate legislation could be considered.446
The modern NSA story is in part about the supposed leapfrogging of technology. The story is familiar. The technologies
of surveillance and its evasion change rapidly. The bad guys
keep up with them, and the government lags behind, always
playing catch up.447 “NSA does not ‘engage in wiretapping’”; its
electronic surveillance is referred to as “signals intelligence” or
SIGINT.448 “NSA intercepts entire streams of electronic communications containing millions of calls and e-mails,” and
screens them through computers that search for key words or
phrases, telephone numbers, or Internet addresses.449 Data
that is identified as worthy of further investigation is generated
by the computers, and then forwarded to NSA personnel.450 Of
course, the immense volume of electronic communication in the
world today is such that NSA collects only a small portion of it.
Some of what is collected is in foreign languages, and some is
442. S. REP. NO. 94-774, pt. 3, at 738, 740.
443. Id. at 740.
444. Id.
445. S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 34 n.40, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3904, 3936; H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, at 21 (1978).
446. S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 71–72 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3904, 4040–41.
447. But see James Bamford, Big Brother Is Listening, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Apr. 2006, at 65, 69 (describing how the NSA attempts to keep up
with new technologies).
448. Id. at 66.
449. Id.
450. Id.
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encrypted, while technical issues limit the capabilities of NSA
computers to find all the desired identified markers.451 Accordingly, NSA must establish priorities for its collection activities.
Is FISA an impediment to the government in the technology race? One part of the NSA program, first reported by the
media in May 2006, apparently consists of collecting meta-data,
information about communications, but not the contents of
those communications.452 NSA collects the phone numbers or email addresses and the time and day of communications between sets of numbers or addresses.453 Computers then sift
through the billions of pieces of data and cross reference them
with information databases in order to identify persons for further investigation.454
The FISA definition of “electronic surveillance” extends to
some non-content information, and thus even the indiscriminate data mining program run by NSA may require a FISA application and order before it is performed, or, on an emergency
basis, an application within seventy-two hours of approval by
the Attorney General.455 Attorney General Edward Levi testified in 1975 that FISA should include provisions for the approval of “program[s] of surveillance” for foreign intelligence
when there are no “specifically predetermined targets” and
where “the efficiency of a warrant requirement would be minimal.”456 Of course, Congress enacted FISA without such a provision and the compromise that became FISA included a considered judgment that only individualized consideration of
applications for secret surveillance to collect foreign intelligence would be prescribed.
One additional problem with the TSP is that NSA computers do not know who placed the calls or sent the messages,
nor do they know the contents of those communications. How
451. See id. at 69 (“[The NSA’s offices] at Crypto City also houses the nation’s largest collection of powerful computers, advanced mathematicians, and
skilled language experts.”).
452. Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls,
USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, at 1A; John O’Neil, Bush Says U.S. Spying Is Not
Widespread, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2006, at A1 (describing the program and its
description by USA Today).
453. See O’Neil, supra note 452.
454. See Harris, supra note 300, at 48.
455. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(f ), 1805(e), 1805(f )(2) (2000 & Supp. III 2004).
456. 152 CONG. REC. S2340–01 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (discussing and citing Attorney General Levi’s testimony before the
Church Committee on U.S. Intelligence Activities).
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and based on what criteria does someone demonstrate probable
cause or even reasonable suspicion to justify targeted surveillance that triggers FISA? Kim Taipale proposes “the electronic
surveillance equivalent of a Terry457 stop”—in this case “an authorized period for follow-up monitoring or investigation of initial suspicion derived from automated monitoring.”458 Taipale’s
reasonable suspicion standard would form the basis for the
judgment either to discontinue or continue the automated
monitoring at this early stage. If the monitoring produces probable cause of foreign agency (or lone wolf status), a traditional
FISA process could be launched by NSA and the Department of
Justice.459 Taipale does not suggest that programmatic measures be used indiscriminately in search of terrorist activities.
Instead, officials should direct these techniques “against known
or reasonably suspected foreign terrorist communication
sources,” sources not subject to FISA or a traditional law enforcement warrant, and employ them to “automate the process
of looking for connections, relationships, and patterns for further follow-up investigation.”460 Taipale offers examples—“Abu
Musab Zarqawi’s cell phone number or a known al Qa’ida
communication network in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or Hamburg.”461 In a similar vein, Judge Richard Posner laments that,
while FISA has value for monitoring known terrorists, “it is
hopeless as a framework for detecting terrorists.”462 Posner argues that the FISA requirement of probable cause of foreign
agency before electronic surveillance may be approved is of no
help “when the desperate need is to find out who is a terrorist.”463 Yet what kind of rule-based program could permit surveillance in the circumstances of concern to Taipale and Judge
Posner that would consist of anything other than the unilateral
discretion of executive officials and intelligence professionals?
Who would determine what counts as a suspected foreign terrorist communication source for these purposes, and what cri457. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968) (permitting police to detain a suspect for a reasonable period without probable cause to arrest).
458. Taipale, supra note 435, at 1, 5–6.
459. Id. at 7.
460. Modernization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing
Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong. 1–5 (2006)
(statement of Kim Taipale, Executive Dir., Ctr. for Advanced Studies in Sci. &
Tech. Policy).
461. Taipale, supra note 435, at 9 n.15.
462. Posner, supra note 336.
463. Id.
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teria would be used to decide whether and how to continue follow-up investigations?
B. IS THE TSP LAWFUL?
At this writing, a few legal conclusions about the TSP may
be at least tentatively drawn. First, the NSA has, by the public
admissions of administration officials, conducted the foreign intelligence “electronic surveillance” that is subject to FISA, taking into account the changes in technology since 1978.464 Second, although the President may have had Commander-inChief Clause authority to engage in a range of surveillance activities incident to conducting a lawful war, in the absence of
congressional legislation limiting such discretion, the Supreme
Court has consistently upheld the authority of Congress to
limit that authority.465 In this context, Congress intended to
foreclose the authority the President might have previously had
under the Constitution to conduct such surveillance without
statutory authority.466 The same section of FISA also forecloses
implying foreign intelligence electronic surveillance authority
in any other statute—only a clear authorization in a statute
subsequent to FISA could overcome the original preclusion.467
The administration has argued that the Authorization for the
Use of Military Force (AUMF)468 permits the NSA surveillance,
extrapolating from the Supreme Court’s determination that the
AUMF authorized the use of military detention in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.469 The AUMF argument could fail on the context distinctions between detention of those captured on a battlefield
and electronic surveillance of Americans inside the United
States. The distinctions matter less, however, than the stark
history of the immediate post-September 11 period. At the
same time that Congress passed the AUMF, it was considering
versions of what later became the Patriot Act. Among the most
464. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f )(1),(2) (2000 & Supp. III 2004); see Gonzales, Georgetown Remarks, supra note 316.
465. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006); Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466, 473–74, 485 (2004); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 585–89 (1952); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178–79
(1804).
466. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f ) (2000 & Supp. III 2004).
467. See Banks supra note 16, at 1153–58.
468. Authorization of Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
469. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at
587 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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important features of the Patriot Act were those that amended
FISA to provide greater tools for the government in the war on
terrorism.470 It is difficult to conclude that the AUMF permitted electronic surveillance inside the United States beyond
what Congress was simultaneously revising in FISA. Apart
from its questionable application to electronic surveillance inside the United States, the AUMF should not be read to overcome the “exclusivity” provision of FISA. The comprehensiveness of FISA is reinforced by the section that permits electronic
surveillance without approval by the FISC for fifteen days immediately following a declaration of war.471
The stronger constitutional argument for the administration is that Article II permits the President to authorize warrantless surveillance of Americans inside the United States to
gather information about terrorist activities.472 Two courts of
appeal so held before FISA was enacted.473 Now, however, the
constitutional question is whether FISA is unconstitutional in
restricting the President’s authority to authorize warrantless
surveillance.474 Congress enacted FISA pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority to regulate wire communications between states and between nations.475 FISA is also an exercise of
the Necessary and Proper Clause, because it serves to “carry[]
into execution” other national security powers of Congress and
also because it reaches NSA (part of the Department of Defense) incident to its power “[t]o make Rules for the Govern-

470. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 201–202, 115 Stat. 272, 278 (2001)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2000)) (expanding law enforcement surveillance authorities to reach terrorism-related activities); id. §§ 203(b), (c), 115
Stat. 272, 280–81 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2510, 50 U.S.C. § 403-5d (2000)) (authorizing information sharing between law enforcement and intelligence agencies); id. § 206, 115 Stat. 272, 282 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2000)) (authorizing roving wiretaps); id. §§ 209, 210, 212, 115 Stat. 272, 283–86 (amending
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2702, 2703 (2000)) (allowing access to wire and electronic
communications); id. §§ 214, 215, 115 Stat. 272, 286–88 (amending 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1842, 1843, 1861, 1862 (2000)) (limiting pen register and trap and trace authority and access to business records of United States persons); id. § 218, 115
Stat. 272, 291 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (2000)) (change in the purpose
standard).
471. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (West 2006).
472. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
473. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605–08 (3d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973).
474. See Statement of David S. Kris, supra note 313 (applying the separation of powers balancing and concluding that “a lot turns on the facts”).
475. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
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ment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”476 Does
FISA unconstitutionally restrict the President’s national security authority? The answer turns on the facts of the TSP, which
are not publicly available. If General Hayden describes the program accurately, the administration made a stark choice to circumvent the FISA probable cause and judicial approval processes for a lower threshold without judicial involvement.
Unless something less than probable cause to believe that the
target is a foreign agent is demanded because of changes in
surveillance technology, existing judicial precedent would not
support the TSP.477
In the wake of the revelations of the TSP, instead of chastising the administration for acting outside an inter-branch
system for implementing one of the most important national
security measures of our time, Congress may be on the brink of
gutting what remains of the FISA system.
C. PROPOSALS TO AMEND FISA
Most of the proposals to amend FISA generated after the
TSP story broke would make radical changes in the law. The
bills favored by the administration would repeal the FISA exclusivity provision and its attendant criminal penalties, thus
making it optional for the administration to seek an order from
the FISC for electronic surveillance inside the United States
against United States persons.478 This is, of course, the heart of
the 1978 compromise—subjecting electronic surveillance to the
terms of the FISA deal in every instance.479 Between FISA’s
enactment in 1978 and September 11, Attorneys General issued forty seven emergency authorizations under FISA.480 In
the first eighteen months after September 11, the Attorney
General authorized more than 170 emergency authorizations

476. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
477. See Banks supra note 16, at 1181–84.
478. See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 2006: S. 3931 AND TITLE II OF S. 3929, THE TERRORIST
TRACKING, IDENTIFICATION AND PROSECUTION ACT OF 2006 at 8–9 (2006).
479. See Statement of Former National Security Officials, Sept. 25, 2006,
http://www.cdt.org/security/20060927officials.pdf (expressing opposition to
proposal to eliminate the exclusivity provision of FISA and signed by former
FBI Directors and Counsel, former CIA Counsel, Department of Justice officials).
480. Dan Eggen & Robert O’Harrow, Jr., U.S. Steps Up Secret Surveillance,
WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2003, at A7.
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for electronic surveillance or search.481 To provide an explicit
escape from FISA for the executive branch would likely curtail
significantly the FISC oversight that emergency applications
currently receive.
Despite General Hayden’s claims that the TSP is narrowly
focused on targets that are reasonably suspected of terrorist
links and is not a drag net or massive data mining program,
proposals were made to amend FISA to authorize “programmatic approvals of cutting-edge technologies—including automated monitoring of suspected terrorist communications.”482
Kim Taipale argues that FISA should be amended so that its
definition of “electronic surveillance” can accommodate orders
to capture the data and voice communications inside modern
networks.483 He also acknowledges that the automated monitoring that Hayden favors could not be done under FISA as it
now stands because the intercepts would not meet the probable
cause standard, even if submitted retroactively under the emergency authority.484
The administration-backed proposals to amend FISA
would ratify the TSP by authorizing the FISC to approve “electronic surveillance programs” inside the United States, for up
to ninety days, renewable by the FISC.485 Such a program
would have as a “significant purpose the gathering of foreign
intelligence information or protecting against international terrorism” where it is “not feasible” to name the targets or locations, where “flexibility” is required for “effective” surveillance,
and where an “extended period” of surveillance is contemplated.486 The FISC could authorize a program for up to 90 days
initially, and the court could reauthorize a program for any
“reasonable” period.487 If the FISC denied an application, the
Attorney General could reapply or appeal to the FISCR.488 If,
during an approved program of surveillance, the Attorney General determines that any target of the program could satisfy the
criteria for individualized consideration under FISA,
surveillance of that target must be discontinued unless an ap481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.

Id.
Taipale & Carafano, supra note 336.
Taipale, supra note 435, at 5–7.
Id. at 8 n.9.
BAZAN, supra note 478, at 12–13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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plication is made, either for continued programmatic surveillance or for an individual order of surveillance from the
FISC.489
So styled, this proposal is just as devastating to FISA as
the repeal of the exclusivity provision. The “program” could be
used when its sole purpose is the collection of evidence for
prosecution, and, instead of any version of a probable cause requirement, the program has only to be “reasonably designed” to
meet its objectives.490 The “electronic surveillance program”
could become the contemporary general warrant, going beyond
even what has been publicly described as the TSP.
The administration-backed proposals also expand the definition of “agent of a foreign power” to reach non-U.S. persons
who possess, control, transmit, or receive significant foreign intelligence information while in the United States.491 This definition requires no connection of the target to a terrorist organization and no showing of a link to international terrorism. Both
approaches end the collaborative roles of Congress and the judiciary in monitoring intrusive surveillance for foreign intelligence inside the United States, and both restore constitutional
doubt to one of the administration’s most important counters to
the threat of terrorism.
One of the main choke points in FISA is the expansive
definition of “electronic surveillance.”492 Whether by prescient
drafting or simple luck, the definition is broad enough to reach
modern communications technologies, including many of the
technologies that NSA uses. To avoid becoming ensnared in
traditional FISA procedures, the 2006 bills the administration
favors would narrow the previously expansive definition, enabling NSA electronic monitoring or data mining so long as the
government is not intentionally targeting a United States person inside the United States.493 No order of the FISC would be
required in these situations, including the vast vacuum
cleaner-like operations of NSA.494 Warrantless surveillance
would be expressly permitted under these bills, including any
communication between a U.S. person and foreign power or
agent of foreign power, so long as the target is one of the latter
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 6 n.9.
Id. at 9–10.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(f ) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
BAZAN, supra note 478, at 10–11.
Id. at 12–15.
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categories.495 Existing minimization requirements would also
be eliminated, so that the contents of electronic communications of U.S. persons could be stored and disseminated without
statutory restriction.496
A more modest set of proposals seeks to retain the FISA
compromise, update some provisions in light of changing technologies, and assure that the Justice Department has adequate
resources and personnel to meet the challenges of the FISA
processes.497 One bill would extend the FISA emergency period
from seventy two hours to seven days and allow the Attorney
General to delegate the authority to approve FISA applications
and to authorize emergency surveillance.498 This bill would also
require development of improved management systems for facilitating the FISA application process and authorize hiring
more staff to meet the demands of regular or emergency applications under FISA.499 While these measures may stand the
least chance of enactment in the short term, their enactment
could actually restore some elements of the FISA compromise.
As described by Attorney General Gonzales and General
Hayden, the TSP targets communications involving those for
whom there is reasonable suspicion of a link to al Qaeda or a
group of affiliates of al Qaeda.500 Monitoring occurs then only if
one end of the communication is abroad.501 Although this warrantless electronic surveillance itself violates FISA, the leading
bills would ratify the TSP and then go farther and permit the
twenty-first century equivalents of general warrants.502 Viewed
in the aggregate, the bills would authorize NSA to listen in on
the contents of phone conversations of U.S. citizens inside the
United States without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion (the “program” must be “reasonably designed” to intercept
the communications of suspected terrorists) that the person is
connected in any way to terrorism—even where the conversation itself has nothing to do with terrorism (interception permitted of a person who “is reasonably believed to have commu495. Id.
496. Id. at 11–12.
497. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Oversight and Resource Enhancement Act of 2006, S. 4051, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
498. Id. § 201.
499. See id. § 102.
500. See Press Briefing, Gonzales & Hayden, supra note 322.
501. Id.
502. See BAZAN supra note 478, at 12–13.
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nication with or be associated with” a suspected terrorist).503
Because the purpose of the warrantless surveillance program
may be to “protect against international terrorism,” it could be
employed when the sole objective is to build evidence for prosecution.504 In other words, the bills permit wholesale eavesdropping.
D. CAN FISA BE SAVED?
It is difficult from this vantage point—thirty years out—to
understand that FISA may have been the best possible accommodation of the conflict between national security and civil liberties when it comes to surveillance. It is unrealistic to expect a
model like FISA to last forever or for it to remain immune from
the need for revisions and updates. Congress first amended
FISA in 1994, when it added physical search authority through
several provisions that set up parallel processes to those in
place for electronic surveillance.505 Pen register, trap and trace,
and business records acquisition were added to the FISA processes in 1998,506 while less extensive revisions were made to
the definition of “agent of a foreign power” in 1999 and to targeting language in 2000.507
The 2001 Patriot Act did more than change the foreign intelligence “purpose” requirement in seeking to increase the
sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information. In
more ways than one, the Patriot Act foretold the death of FISA.
In the emergency atmosphere that engulfed Congress after
September 11, a hastily considered set of fundamental changes
to FISA was enacted, buffered by the fact that many were subject to a four-year sunset.508 Although the “significant purpose”
amendment was chosen for more extensive consideration in
this Article, the theme developed here could have been
503. Id. at 6 n.9.
504. See id. at 3.
505. Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-359, 108 Stat. 3423 (2001).
506. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105272, 112 Stat. 2396 (1998).
507. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106567, § 602, 114 Stat. 2831, 2851–53 (2000); Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-120, § 601, 113 Stat. 1606, 1619 (1999).
508. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224(a), 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001);
see, e.g., Patricia Bellia, The “Lone Wolf” Amendment and the Future of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 425, 429 n.31 (2005) (describing FISA’s sunset provisions).
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sketched using the roving wiretaps provision,509 the enhanced
pen register and trap and trace authorities,510 or the expansion
of the national security letters and document production authorities to reach “any tangible thing.”511
After a modest expansion of information sharing authority
in FISA by the Homeland Security Act of 2002,512 the 2004 intelligence reform legislation significantly expanded FISA by
adding the “lone wolf ” amendment to “agent of a foreign
power.”513 As the sunsets loomed in 2005, Congress approved
short-term extensions until enacting the USA PATRIOT Reauthorization Act of 2005 in March 2006.514 Fourteen of the
sixteen provisions due to sunset were made permanent in the
Act, while the roving wiretaps, “tangible thing,” and “lone wolf”
provisions were extended until the end of 2009.515
Even if Congress enacts none of the proposals to amend
FISA being considered at the end of the 109th Congress, it is
fair to say that the compromise collapsed with September 11.
Perhaps the richest example of how the emergency atmospherics worked to undo the compromise that served well for more
than two decades is the review of the Patriot Act purpose
change by the FISC and the FISCR. At the time, that group of
seven FISC judges probably understood FISA mechanics, processes, and the delicate balancing of interests it represented better than anyone. In the face of the emergency and the statutory
change, the judges did their best to preserve the central purpose of FISA while respecting the changes made in the Patriot
Act. The FISC opinion reached a fair accommodation of the
competing interests, even though the court’s emphasis on complying with the minimization requirements of FISA struck
many readers, including the FISCR, as not responsive to the
government’s argument and not as central to their outcome as
the original purposes of FISA and its reasonableness in light of
the Fourth Amendment.
509. Patriot Act, § 206.
510. Id. § 214.
511. Id. §§ 215, 505; see Schulhofer supra note 163, at 544–61.
512. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 898, 116 Stat.
2258 (2002) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k)(1)).
513. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, § 6001, 118 Stat. 3638, 3742 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 1801(b)(1)(c) (West 2006)).
514. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006).
515. Id. § 103, 120 Stat. 195 (2006).
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Minimization procedures are designed to protect U.S. persons from having what would typically be the inevitable byproduct
of
indiscriminate
electronic
surveillance—
communications intercepted that are not foreign intelligence—
from being acquired, retained, or disseminated.516 As the FISC
saw a FISA future under the proposed OIPR procedures, the
amount of non-foreign intelligence information that would be
collected would increase, and the possibility of direction and
control of a FISA investigation by the Criminal Division meant
that considerable non-foreign intelligence information would be
collected, stored, and disseminated.517 In effect, the FISC worried that FISA would be used to enforce the criminal law, and
that application of FISA surveillance would be inconsistent
with the underlying purpose of minimization.518
Based on the long experience of the FISC judges in working with FISA and its implementation, their concern with the
effects of the new procedures on minimization was understandable. Particularly since the 1995 procedures promulgated by
Attorney General Reno heightened the sensitivities of FISC
judges to inappropriate uses of FISA in criminal investigations,
the court was especially wary of endorsing what could be seen
as a way to work around the rigors of Title III warrants.519 Yet
the FISC was, to some extent, a prisoner of its limited perspective and its symbiotic relationship with OIPR. Without meaningful oversight by Congress or other Article III courts, the
FISC was “coached” by OIPR after 1995 to elevate the wall and
information screening procedures beyond the statutory requirements.520 FISA explained the prohibition on the Criminal
Division directing or controlling FISA surveillance, but it did
not justify the restrictive screening walls that stood in the way
of effective cooperation and coordination. Thus, the 2002 FISC
decision puzzled many observers. If the proposed OIPR procedures would enable prosecutors to use FISA when obtaining Title III warrants was too difficult, the more visible and concrete
legal problem was that the purpose of the investigation was no

516. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 737 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
517. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 624–25 (FISA Ct. 2002), abrogated by In re Sealed
Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
518. Id.
519. Id. at 619–24.
520. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 167, at 78.
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longer to collect foreign intelligence, or that the surveillance
would be undertaken in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
It was understandable for the FISCR to rebuke the FISC
for basing their decision on the FISA minimization requirements, and for failing to respond directly to the Patriot Act arguments advanced by the government. As the FISCR construed
FISA, the minimization requirements allow the dissemination
for law enforcement purposes of non-foreign intelligence information that is evidence of ordinary crimes.521 In addition, the
FISCR correctly noted that expanding foreign intelligence collection to include evidence of crimes is not the same as directing a FISA investigation for the purpose of building a criminal
case.522 In addition, the “chaperone requirement” that the FISC
fashioned and the FISCR overturned,523 where OIPR was to “be
invited” to all meetings between the intelligence and criminal
division staff, was cumbersome and not essential to the preservation of the foreign intelligence essence of FISA.
Still, it was not “quite puzzling,” as the FISCR proclaimed,
that the pre-Patriot Act Justice Department read FISA “as limiting the Department’s ability to obtain FISA orders if it intended to prosecute the targeted agents—even for foreign intelligence crimes.”524 As noted above, the FISCR conflated what
FISA surveillance is used for with the purpose for seeking FISA
procedures. Even though the foreign agency definition is, as the
FISCR noted, “grounded on criminal conduct.”525 That OIPR
misconstrued the procedures and applied them in a skewed
fashion to erect barriers to sharing information is highly unfortunate, but it is not a justification for eliminating the central
protection against law enforcement direction and control of the
FISA processes. FISA requires a significant foreign intelligence
purpose before surveillance may be approved by the FISC. It
was that assurance that the FISC was understandably seeking
to protect.
In any case, reversal of the FISC was an overreaction, and
the rhetoric of crisis and fear appeared to outstrip calm reflection in its opinion. In their first ever consideration of a FISA
matter, the three judges misunderstood the historical distinctions about primary purpose that FISA case law created. The
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.

50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(3) (2000); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736.
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735–36.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 723.
Id.
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FISCR also misidentified the source of the information-sharing
problem—the cultures and traditions of intelligence and law
enforcement, not FISA—and, in doing so, overturned a thoughtful effort by the full and experienced FISC to preserve the fundamental FISA values. By suggesting that there may be constitutional problems with FISA in hamstringing executive power
if it were read as the FISC interpreted it,526 the FISCR drove a
stake at the heart of the FISA compromise, while failing to stop
the Justice Department from unraveling one of the principal
understandings that helped build FISA in the beginning.
The FISCR reasonably feared that it may be impossible to
separate the criminal conspiracy from the terrorist activities
elements of a foreign organization.527 Yet the court gave too little credit to the tendency of potential abuses of the secret FISA
authorities. While the need to share information and even to
combine law enforcement and intelligence investigative teams
may be reasonable, it does not follow that the Ashcroft guidelines option of having the criminal team initiate, direct, and
control a FISA investigation is justified.528
Ironically, the differences between the pre- and postPatriot Act versions of FISA were not that great, at least not
regarding the purpose requirement.529 Most of the time it will
be possible to ascribe a “significant” foreign intelligence purpose in making an application to the FISC where the government is also developing a criminal case.530 The differences between the 1995 FISC guidelines, (as written, not as applied)
and what the Justice Department proposed in 2002 would
likely matter in only a few instances.531 Following the current
counter-terrorism prevention paradigm, the government may
decide to break up what it believes to be a terrorist conspiracy
by prosecuting a collateral crime, such as immigration violations or credit card fraud. If the criminal evidence is collected
during FISA surveillance, may it be used to prosecute, even
though the crimes are unrelated to the foreign intelligence or
counter-terrorism purpose of the surveillance? Most of the time
526. Id. at 731.
527. Id. at 736.
528. See Schulhofer, supra note 163, at 540.
529. Banks, supra note 16, at 1177–81.
530. The USA PATRIOT Act in Practice: Shedding Light on the FISA Process, Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 126 (2002) (statement of David S. Kris, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen.).
531. Banks, supra note 16, at 1191.
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the collateral crime—credit card fraud, for example—will be
connected to the terrorist activities and will thus present an
easy “significant purpose” determination in the FISA certification. If, however, the strategy at the time the FISA application
is made is to find the evidence of crimes unrelated to the foreign intelligence—a suspected terrorist who consumes child
pornography, for example—FISA should not be available for
the surveillance because the law enforcement and foreign intelligence interests are not intertwined, and the enforcement procedures should be available for investigation and prosecution of
the crimes. If some unrelated collateral crimes are discovered
later, during FISC-approved foreign intelligence collection,
then the criminal evidence should be available in a prosecution.
Although a “significant” foreign intelligence purpose is present
in both examples, the purpose of the FISA processes would be
subverted if the unrelated collateral crimes strategy is allowed
to direct and control FISA surveillance.
1. Minimization Reforms?
Consistent with the prevention strategy, it would be possible to amend the minimization requirements in FISA to permit
more real time information sharing between foreign intelligence and law enforcement investigators. As FISA minimization is now prescribed, criminal evidence obtained through
FISA procedures disseminated for law enforcement purposes is
evidence of a crime “which has been, is being, or is about to be
committed.”532 Minimization thus requires that responsible officials make an a priori or contemporaneous decision that the
collected information is evidence of a crime. The Sarkissian,
Duggan, Hammoud, and Lakhani examples in the introduction
to this Article are model applications of permissible sharing of
law enforcement information consistent with the minimization
requirements.533 In Sarkissian, Duggan, and Lakhani, the collection of foreign intelligence led to the evidence of the
crimes.534 Once the crimes were discovered, the FISA surveillance came to an end. In Hammoud, the cigarette smuggling
and support for Hezbollah investigations overlapped, but the
FISA surveillance was reviewed by the courts and was found to

532. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(3) (2000).
533. See supra text accompanying notes 42–55.
534. See supra text accompanying notes 42–55.
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be undertaken for the primary purpose of collecting foreign intelligence.535
In other situations, investigators might not know the intelligence or law enforcement value of collected information at the
time it is collected. Investigators may wish to continue collecting foreign intelligence with FISA procedures while at the same
time continuing to collect what may amount to evidence of a
collateral crime—not a national security crime—and the minimization rule would not permit the sharing of that information
with law enforcement. Simply requiring that officials seek a Title III warrant at that point in an investigation may not be a
practical option if the result would be to blow the cover off the
FISA collection, through delayed notice to the target. Professor
Yoo argues that surveillance should be permitted “where there
is a reasonable chance that terrorists will appear, or communicate, even if we do not know their specific identities.”536 Yoo offers an example:
What if we knew that there was a 50 percent chance that terrorist
would use a certain communications pipeline, like e-mail accounts on
a popular Pakistani service, but that most of the communications on
that channel would not be linked to terrorism? A FISA-based approach would prevent computers from searching through that channel
for the keywords or names that might suggest terrorist communications, because we would have no specific al Qaeda suspects, and thus
no probable cause. Rather than individualized suspicion, searching
for terrorists will depend on playing the probabilities, just as roadblocks or airport screenings do.537

Professor Yoo maintains that “[i]ndividualized suspicion
does not make sense when the purpose of intelligence is to take
action, such as killing or capturing members of the enemy.”538
Would Professor Yoo extend this model to electronic surveillance inside the United States? Under his model, are targets of
foreign intelligence surveillance “members of the enemy”? Professor Yoo might endorse Kim Taipale’s suggestion of an electronic Terry stop as a means of accommodating the interest in
individualized suspicion.539 However, if Yoo’s premise is accepted, who decides when to forego individualized suspicion,
what criteria guide such a decision, and what should be done
535. United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2004) (en
banc), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005).
536. YOO, supra note 206, at 111–12.
537. Id. at 112.
538. Id.
539. See supra text accompanying notes 457–71.
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with the collected intelligence? Is the inevitable high rate of
false positives and accompanying chilling of protected expression and individual privacy worth the gain in surveillance discretion?540
2. An Exclusionary Rule for FISA?
Alternatively, minimization could be better managed by
the FISC if the federal courts were to enforce a species of exclusionary rule, where the government would be prevented from
using FISA-obtained information as evidence in a prosecution
of a target for a so-called collateral crime—one having nothing
to do with terrorism or national security—if none of the evidence demonstrated that the criminal conduct had any connection to terrorism or national security.541 If this form of use limit
were faithfully observed and enforced, the damage done to the
purpose rule by the Patriot Act and the FISCR decision could
be repaired, after the fact. Instead of the ex ante purpose rule,
the use limit would accomplish the same end ex post.542 The potential for privacy invasions by investigators using FISA inappropriately would remain, but a check on the utility of the misuse would discourage the original invasion.543 Elsewhere I
proposed the hypothetical of “an international terrorist [who] is
also a drug dealer—not to support terrorist activities but to
support himself.”544 If FISA surveillance is obtained and evidence of the drug dealing derived from the FISA surveillance is
offered as evidence, it should be excluded under this approach,
while the same material would be admissible if the target is
charged with using his narcotics proceeds to materially support
terrorism. In addition, a use limit would, unlike FISA minimization, be based on Fourth Amendment reasonableness and not
on the terms of FISA, thus enabling the protections of the use
limit to be enjoyed by targets who are not U.S. persons.545
540. A full consideration of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article.
They are explored generally in MCMAHON, supra note 37, passim. See also
Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 passim (2002).
541. See Matthew R. Hall, Constitutional Regulation of National Security
Investigation: Minimizing the Use of Unrelated Evidence, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 61, 102–03 (2006) (proposing such a rule, using the sale of narcotics as an
example of the unrelated charge).
542. Id. at 103.
543. Id.
544. Banks, supra note 16, at 1179.
545. Hall, supra note 541, at 109.
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If some sort of ex post use limit is employed to lessen the
minimization task and shore up the weakened purpose requirement in FISA, would the cure be worse than the disease,
i.e., would the use limit stand in the way of effective national
security or counter-terrorism investigations that do not result
in criminal prosecutions? For example, if FISA surveillance uncovers information ultimately insufficient to build a criminal
case related to terrorism, but obtains enough information to
deport the target for a visa overstay or to prosecute for an unrelated crime, the target might raise the use limit in an eventual
deportation hearing or criminal proceeding through the ex
parte, in camera hearing to suppress the evidence. Conceivably,
the executive could be forced to expose intelligence sources and
methods, or simply to alert the target to the nature of the FISA
investigation. These are not trivial concerns, but their resolution, if a use limit were accepted and utilized, would likely parallel the outcomes of challenges by criminal defendants under
the pre-Patriot Act primary purpose standard—the courts uniformly upheld the FISA surveillance with a high level of deference to the executive branch and the FISC.546
3. Improved Oversight of FISA Activities
Because Congress and the courts have not provided meaningful oversight of FISA activities, the FISC has served an important oversight capacity in addition to its responsibility to
review applications for surveillance. In 2000, the FISC complained that several applications to the court contained factual
inaccuracies.547 Thereafter, the FBI developed FISA verification procedures to better ensure the accuracy of the facts in
each FISA application, particularly those concerning the probable cause determination, and the existence and nature of any
parallel law enforcement processes or prior or ongoing asset relationship involving the target. The procedures require computer database searches and efforts to check the status of the
target with other units of the FBI.548 When FOIA requests

546. Id. at 110.
547. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620–21 (FISA Ct. 2002), abrogated by In re Sealed
Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
548. Memorandum from Michael J. Woods, FBI Office of Gen. Counsel, on
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Procedures to Ensure Accuracy of All
Field Offices (April 5, 2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/
doj/fisa/woods.pdf.
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turned up additional data two years later, the FBI detailed over
one hundred instances over two years where procedural requirements of FISA may not have been met, such as conducting
wiretaps that were broader in scope and longer in duration
than approved by the FISC.549 This recent record reinforces the
importance that Congress should attach to oversight of the
FISA processes. Whether Congress provides greater oversight
itself or through the FISC, it should not be left to the discretion
of the Department of Justice to decide whether and how to use
the FISA processes.550
E. REVISIONS TO FISA TO ACCOMMODATE THE TSP
During a September 15, 2006 news conference, President
Bush commented on the bills in Congress that would amend
FISA to account for the NSA surveillance program. One questioner asked about the “eavesdropping program.” The President
responded: “[Y]es, the illegal eavesdropping program you
wanted to call it . . . IEP, as opposed to TSP.”551
To those who doubt that the technology-challenged Congress is capable of legislating an effective system for surveillance of would-be terrorists, recall that the Bush administration specifically stated in 2001 that the Patriot Act allowed
“surveillance of all communications used by terrorists,” and
that the Act makes us able to “better meet the technological
challenges posed by this proliferation of communications technology.”552 In March 2006, when the Patriot reauthorization
was completed and most of the sunsets repealed, the Justice
Department reiterated that the Patriot Act provisions “brought
the federal government’s ability to investigate . . . into the
modern era—by modifying our investigative tools to reflect
modern technologies.”553 So far as all but a handful of members

549. Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. Report Cites Intelligence-Rule Violations
by F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at A21.
550. See Schulhofer, supra note 163, at 541–42 (urging greater FISA oversight of individual cases by FISC judges as well as public and congressional
oversight).
551. President’s News Conference, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1617
(Sept. 15, 2006).
552. Remarks on Signing of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1307 (Oct. 26, 2001).
553. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: USA PATRIOT ACT IMPROVEMENT
AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005, No. 06-113 (Mar. 2, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/March/06_opa_113.html.
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of Congress knew, it had met the technological demands of the
executive branch for effective surveillance authorities.
Nonetheless, some variant of the TSP program could be accommodated after changes to FISA that would not rip apart the
fabric of the Act. First, FISA could be amended to permit surveillance from “within the United States” of the electronic
communications of an agent of a foreign power abroad who is
talking to a U.S. person. Modern communications packets of
foreign-to-foreign calls or e-mails of non-U.S. persons may pass
through the United States as a function of the way that technology operates.554 The revelation that NSA has been doing just
that in the TSP, with the cooperation of telecommunications
providers, lets those who we might intercept know something
about U.S. capabilities that probably was not known—that
even wholly foreign communications may pass through massive
switches in the U.S. network. Even though the element of surprise has been eliminated, the location of the switch where the
interception of electronic communication by an agent of a foreign power takes place should not affect its legality.
Second, in situations where the government is targeting
the foreign communications of a non-U.S. person abroad, FISA
does not apply, but if the target calls the United States, the
surveillance must be turned off. While amending FISA to exclude from its coverage such surveillance when incident to an
ongoing electronic surveillance of a non-U.S. person abroad
means that an agency could listen in on innocent persons inside
the United States,555 such a risk might be small in return for
the gain to the overall foreign intelligence gained in the surveillance.
Third, the FISA minimization requirements could be made
more flexible. The fact that the FISC and FISCR had fundamentally different conceptions of what minimization was designed to accomplish in FISA may be reason enough to revisit
its objectives. More important, minimization should take into
account the contemporary reality that the information collected
cannot always be pigeonholed a priori in a binary world as foreign intelligence or criminal violation evidence. Assuming continued government interest in prosecuting terrorism conspira554. Taipale, supra note 435, at 4.
555. See Legislative Proposals to Update the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 38–39 (2006) (statement of James X. Dempsey, Policy Dir., Ctr. for Democracy and Tech.).
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cies that are inchoate,556 a FISA investigation that happens to
turn up collateral crimes—where seeking a Title III warrant is
not a practical alternative in the midst of foreign intelligence
collection—could incorporate minimization procedures that are
more flexible in terms of the timing of the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of law enforcement information. A
twenty-first century FISA might tolerate a looser minimization
procedure, with review and oversight mechanisms.
Fourth, in the FISA emergency procedures, one objection
made by the Bush administration in defending the TSP was
that the FISA procedures required that applications and supporting material for every instance of FISA targeting had to be
completed before initiating the surveillance, even though the
FISC approval process could wait seventy two hours. The FISA
procedures could be streamlined to accommodate the need for
speed and efficiency. A senior official could be made responsible
for asserting a good-faith belief that the FISA targeting criteria
exist regarding the targets in question. The emergency authority would expire, as it now does, at the end of seventy-two
hours or when it has been determined by the Attorney General
or the FISC that the FISA requirements have not been met.557
Of course, traditional judicial review of the TSP may yet
invalidate the program as a violation of the Fourth Amendment
or FISA. If FISA is not amended to authorize or ratify the TSP
in some fashion, a court should enjoin the program as a FISA
violation. In the alternative, warrantless electronic surveillance
of United States citizens inside the United States constitutes a
clear Fourth Amendment violation. One problem in litigating
the TSP is that it is impossible to know, without access to classified information, whether the program engages in such surveillance. Based on the statements of General Hayden and Attorney General Gonzales, however, it appears that NSA listens
in on the contents of phone and e-mail communications where
one participant may be a U.S. citizen inside the United States.
If so, the only Fourth Amendment doctrine that could conceivably justify the program is the so-called “special needs” doctrine,
excepting from the warrant and probable cause requirements
556. See generally Chesney, supra note 66 (discussing the continuum of inchoate terrorism conduct that may be prosecuted).
557. The Justice Department reported considerable progress in streamlining the FISA application and review processes, and in reducing the time
needed to obtain FISC review in its September 2006 news release. DOJ, FACT
SHEET, supra note 6.
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in situations where the government has “special needs” above
and beyond ordinary law enforcement. As has been argued
elsewhere, the special needs cases have sustained drunkdriving checkpoints and drug testing in schools, programs that
are standardized and relatively non-intrusive.558 But the doctrine has never supported the highly discretionary and intrusive likes of the TSP. When the FISCR relied on the “special
needs” cases to support the Ashcroft procedures lowering the
wall,559 the judges did so in the context of a system that is
based on individualized suspicion and prior judicial approval.
TSP contains neither protection.
In the first decision to reach the merits of the TSP, Judge
Anna Diggs Taylor ruled that the TSP violates FISA, the separation of powers, and the First and Fourth Amendments.560 Although the analysis in Judge Taylor’s opinion was spare, and
the case is on appeal,561 several other pending cases562 may
eventually produce a Supreme Court decision on the TSP.
CONCLUSION
So much of the post-September 11 redirection of our
counter-terrorism law and policy in the United States has been
based on the impassioned rhetoric of the war on terrorism. Often forsaking reasoned analysis, careful consideration of costs
and benefits, and alternative courses of action, our postSeptember 11 laws and policies have been developed with a
sort of bunker mentality, designed to anticipate worst case outcomes. Consider the statement of Vice President Richard Cheney, commenting in the wake of the revelations that a Paki-

558. See, e.g., Letter from Former Government Officials and Law Professors, 10 (Feb. 2, 2006) (replying to DOJ Memorandum), available at
http://www.cdt.org/security/nsa/20060202scholars.pdf.
559. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 745–46 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
560. ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
561. ACLU v. NSA, 467 F.3d 590, 591 (6th Cir. 2006) (granting motion for
a stay pending appeal).
562. See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(denying motion to dismiss, holding suit not barred categorically by the state
secrets privilege); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 918–20 (N.D. Ill.
2006) (holding that state secrets privilege barred discovery and, thus, plaintiffs could not establish standing); Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and
Damages, Pascazi v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., No. 06 Civ. 1221 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
16, 2006); Complaint, Ctr. for Constitutional Studies v. Bush, No. 06-CV00313 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 17, 2006).
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stani group with scientific expertise may wish to export nuclear
technologies to Muslim nations:
If there’s a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al
Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response . . . . It’s not about our analysis, or
finding a preponderance of evidence . . . . It’s about our response.563

The prevention policy first announced by Attorney General
Ashcroft shortly after September 11 is hardly the same as
treating the one percent chance as certainty, but it is closer to
policies that treat suspicion as probable cause. What are the
marginal costs and benefits to our national security of laws and
policies that base their operational terms on a “one percent
chance,” or even a reasonable suspicion of a horrific consequence? What values and legal safeguards are lost when traditional standards of proof and evidence are eschewed in favor of
action based on suspicion or an indiscriminate data mining
program? How does a program like TSP serve to disrupt or
even expose al Qaeda or other would-be terrorists? And to what
extent do secret surveillance initiatives like TSP corrode the
democratic values and institutions that we seek to protect from
terrorism? At a minimum, the unraveling of FISA and emergence of the TSP call into question the virtual disappearance of
effective oversight of our national security surveillance. The
Congress and federal courts have become observers of the system, not even participants, much less overseers.564
The circumstances that led to the enactment of FISA
nearly thirty years ago—a chastened executive, an awakened
Congress, courts newly willing to protect privacy in electronic
surveillance settings—may never recur. The imperfect system
for national security surveillance that FISA codified worked
reasonably well through the early 1990’s. As terrorism ascended in importance as a national security concern and Congress and the President worked to enact new laws criminaliz563. RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT SOLUTION: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA’S
PURSUIT OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11, at 62 (2006) (quoting Vice President
Richard Cheney); see also id. at 47–49 (discussing the background on the
Pakistani group and its objectives).
564. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson argue that an emerging “National
Surveillance State” will be driven principally by technological advances and
national security interests. The executive branch will, they say, make decisions to displace the criminal justice system with security mechanisms and to
make other elements of criminal justice like the national security system. Jack
M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 489, 522–23 (2006).
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ing terrorist activities, pressures on the FISA process increased
and its careful accommodation of foreign intelligence and law
enforcement interests was ensnared in bureaucratic confusion,
institutional rivalries, and personal and inter-agency jealousies.565
When the Patriot Act followed soon after September 11, the
institutional and bureaucratic barriers to sharing intelligence
information that contributed to the failure to anticipate the hijackers were misapprehended and translated into a legal
change to FISA that was showcased as breaking down the wall
that kept us from preventing the attacks. The ensuing revision
of Justice Department guidelines and their review by the FISC
and FISCR struck a serious blow to the essential terms of the
FISA arrangement—providing a mechanism for secret surveillance with reduced predicates for targeting, in return for a
commitment that the special process would not be used by
criminal prosecutors who simply could not meet the traditional
warrant requirements. Now the fear expressed by the FISC in
2002—that abuses of FISA could increasingly occur—is not farfetched.
David Kris has pointed out an argument that keeping the
wall down may enhance civil liberties. Kris reasons that, with
the wall out of the way, “more DOJ lawyers may become involved in national security investigations. . . . More lawyers
means more oversight, and lawyer oversight is how [we] protect[] civil liberties in intelligence.” Second, Kris argued, using
law enforcement to counter foreign threats is, considering alternative methods available to the government “among the
most benign. The wall channels government toward more extreme measures.”566
Kris correctly observes that the Church Committee Report
concluded that tethering domestic security investigations to a
legal framework under the supervision of the Attorney General
was one of the fundamental correctives to the abuses uncovered.567 As FISA, FBI Guidelines, and executive orders were

565. See WRIGHT, supra at note 191, 312–13 (maintaining that agency rivalries, institutional culture, and personal hatred between FBI and CIA officials contributed to failures to share intelligence).
566. David S. Kris, The Rise and Fall of the FISA Wall, 17 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 487, 523–24 (2006).
567. Id. at 524; see 2 SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S.
REP. NO. 94-755, at 332 (1976).
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implemented, lawyers closely supervised the gathering of intelligence. According to Kris, the FISA wall kept lawyers in the
field—those working with criminal investigators—away from
intelligence investigations. After the FISCR decision, prosecutors in field offices of the Criminal Division and in U.S. Attorney’s Offices have regular access to intelligence investigators.
Their orientation toward preserving all criminal prosecution
options makes them especially sensitive to rule violations that
could affect the criminal case. Thus, Kris argues, “civil libertarians ought to oppose the wall and encourage increased
prosecutorial involvement in national security investigations.”568
Kris is, of course, speculating about the effects of the wall,
pre- and post-FISCR. Based on its long experience with FISA,
the 2002 en banc FISC was apparently more concerned with
potential prosecutorial misuse of the FISA processes to enhance
the prosecution option than it was with the absence of effective
legal oversight of the implementation of FISA by intelligence
professionals in the field. As noted earlier in this Article, the
pre-certification involvement of legal review in assuring that
FISA is properly applied in all respects, including that a significant purpose of the surveillance is to collect foreign intelligence, is extensive, far more so than the process that attends
Title III warrant applications. I am inclined to respect the
judgment of the experienced FISC judges on this important issue.
Kris’s second claim, that after the fall of the wall, civil liberties are less threatened by the prosecution option more likely
after the fall of the wall because of the “less gentle” options
otherwise likely to be taken, is a reminder that our government
has subjected even United States citizens to military detention
since 2002. In other words, things could always be worse. To be
sure, military detention is the greater threat to civil liberties
than civilian prosecution. While the legal contours of permissible military detention and adjudication are not fully developed,
it is highly unlikely that this draconian alternative to civilian
prosecution would be undertaken on any kind of widespread
basis.
The Justice Department has proudly showcased what it
views as the tremendous benefits from the Patriot Act’s information sharing provisions and the lowering of the wall. One
568. Kris, supra note 566, at 527.
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example involved the Department’s investigations of suspected
al Qaeda cell members in Lackawanna, New York, the so-called
“Lackawanna Six.” The investigation began in the summer of
2001, based on an anonymous tip delivered to the FBI that local Yemeni-Americans might be involved in drug crime and terrorist activities. Initially, FBI “concluded that existing law required the creation of two separate investigations in order to
retain the option of using FISA.”569 According to the Department, the Patriot Act made clear that information sharing between the two teams was allowed, which in turn let the criminal side know that an al Qaeda agent was involved, leading to
early criminal charges against the six.570 This Article has
shown that neither the 1978 FISA nor the 2001 FISA, as
amended by the Patriot Act, stood in the way of simultaneous
investigations of the same target or targets, in parallel or as
one team, so long as the purpose of the FISA investigation was
the collection of foreign intelligence. The wall procedures that
appeared in 1995 were not required by FISA and even those
would have permitted the sharing that allegedly could not occur in the Lackawanna investigation, so long as the Criminal
Division did not direct or control the FISA investigation.571
Meanwhile, rapid and accelerating changes in technology
and in particular the digitization of surveillance and communications presented Congress and the President with ongoing
challenges to keep up with and exceed the communications and
evasion capabilities of adversaries. While FISA was amended
toward these ends to the apparent satisfaction of the executive
branch, the administration approved NSA surveillance and the
TSP. Consistent with the prevention paradigm, the TSP eschews probable cause and individualized suspicion and judicial
569. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT FROM THE FIELD: THE USA PATRIOT
ACT AT WORK 3 (July 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/
patriot0704.pdf.
570. Id.
571. In addition to the Lackawanna investigation, the Justice Department
lists seven other examples “made possible by the USA PATRIOT Act,” Id. at 5.
In all of them, the increased sharing of information and coordination between
law enforcement and intelligence officers has resulted from changes in DOJ
procedures and direction from senior officials, none of which was legally forbidden before the Patriot Act and the FISCR decision. The sharing and coordination contemplated by the 2002 Ashcroft guidelines would have been permitted without the Patriot Act changes. Indeed, the 2002 guidelines prescribe
policies that sound quite similar to those practiced without the benefit of written rules during the OIPR tenure of Mary Lawton. See supra text
accompanying notes 166–68.
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and congressional oversight and review, all hallmarks of FISA.
The extent to which digital capabilities render these central legal instruments obsolete is a complex topic that could only
briefly be considered in this Article. Whatever the answer to
this digital revolution, however, it is clear that what remains of
FISA has been ignored.
In our legal system, we attach great importance to the
value of fair processes. In national security law and policy,
when secrecy has been an important operational requisite, we
have developed review and oversight processes to help assure
that unilateral power is not abused. So has it been with FISA.
In the five years since September 11, those process safeguards
have largely been lost or overtaken. If FISA is to have any
meaningful role for the next thirty years, its central terms will
have to be restored, one way or the other.

